BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 

o 

THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


REPORT 


OF 


GOVERNOR  GROVES 


TO 


GENERAL  SCHOFIELD 


ON  THE 


MODOC    WAK, 

AND 

REPORTS  OF  MAJ.  GEN.  JOHN  F.  MILLER  AND 
GENERAL  JOHN  E.  ROSS, 

TO  THE   GOVERNOR. 

ALSO  LETTER  or  THE  GOVERNOR  TO  THE  SECRETARY  or  THE  INTERIOR 
ON  THE  WALLOWA  VALLEY  INDIAN  QUESTION. 


SALEM,  OREGON: 

MART.    V.    BBOWX,   STATE   PKINTER. 
1874. 


Bancroft  Library 


GOVERNOR    GROVER'S    LETTER 

TO 

GMEIST.      SC  HO  FIELD 

ON  THE 

MODOC    WAE. 



To  Major  General  J.  M.  Schofield, 

Commanding  Military  Division  of  the  Pacific  : 

SIR — In  reply  to  jour  communication  of  June  4,  1873, 
in  which  you  request  that  I  will  cause  a  muster  roll  of  the 
forces  called  out  by  me  to  be  properly  certified  to,  and 
forwarded  to  your  headquarters,  and  also  to  state  if  those 
troops  were  called  out  at  the  invitation  or  solicitation,  or 
by  the  authority  of  any  military  officer  of  the  United 
States,  and  if  any  such  officer,  by  any  act  or  promise  has 
in  any  manner  committed  the  United  States  to  liability 
for  transportation,  forage,  subsistence,  clothing,  equipage, 
etc.,  said  information  being  desired  on  account  of  the 
death  of  General  Canby  and  the  removal  of  officers  on 
I  his  personal  staff: 

I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  the  following:  In 
the  initiation  of  the  late  Modoc  service  no  di  rect  requisition 
was  made  by  General  Canby,  then  in  command  of  the 


MODOC    WAR. 


Department  of  the  Columbia,  on  the  authorities  of  the 
State  of  Oregon,  for  troops,  but  there  was  a  recognized 
co-operation  by  the  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia  in  the  field 
with  the  regular  troops,  and  the  volunteers  served  during 
their  first  campaign  against  the  Modocs,  under  the  com 
mand  of  the  military  officers  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
£el],  with  the  approval  of  General  Canby. 

The  circumstances  attending  the  calling  out  of  the  Ore 
gon  Volunteers  appeared  at  the  time  to  be  imperative  to 
meet  a  sudden  emergency.  In  order  to  exhibit  clearly  the 
nature  and  necessity  of  this  service  it  will  be  proper  to 
detail  some  of  the  leading  facts  antecedent  to  actual  hos 
tilities.  The  Modoc  tribe  of  Indians  have  been  known 
since  the  earliest  immigration  to  Oregon  and  Northern 
California  as  a  band  of  murderers  and  robbers.  They 
have  earned  the  character  of  being  the  most  treacherous 
and  blood-thirsty  savages  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 
They  occupied  a  country  peculiarly  adapted  to  protect 
them  in  their  practice  of  slaughter  and  to  shield  them 
from  successful  pursuit  and  capture.  Innocent  and  unof 
fending  emigrants,  with  their  wives,  and  families,  passing 
through  the  Modoc  country  along  the  old  southern  over 
land  road  to  Oregon,  have  been  attacked  and  butchered 
indiscriminately  by  these  fiends,  their  property  taken  or 
destroyed  and  their  bodies  inhumanly  mutilated  and  left 
unburied  a  prey  to  wolves.  In  some  cases  their  victims 
were  made  to  suffer  the  pains  of  the  moot  cruel  tortures 
before  relieved  by  death,  and  in  some  cases  girls  have 
been  kept  among  them  as  captives  for  months  to  suffer 
more  than  torture,  and  in  the  end  to  meet  their  miserable 
death. 

Over  three  hundred  emigrants  are  known  to  have  been 
slain  in  this  manner  by  these  Indians,  ascertained  by  ac- 


MODOC    WAR. 


'  tual  count  of  their  bleaching  bones  upon  the  soil,  before 
the  establishment  of  the  military  post  at  Fort  Klarnath,  in 
1863.  This  post  was  established  for  the  protection  of  the 
immigrant  trail  and  to  make  an  end  to  the  slaughter  and 
rapine  of  which  these  savages  were  constantly  guilty.  In 
1864  a  treaty  was  made  with  the  Indians  in  the  Klamath 
Lake  Basin,  including  the  Modocs,  by  which  they  ceded 
all  their  lands  to  the  United  States,  except  those  included 
in  the  Klamath  Reservation,  and  agreed  to  reside  exclu 
sively  upon  said  Reservation.  In  the  mean  time  the  pub 
lic  lands  in  that  vicinity  had  been  surveyed  under  the  au 
thority  of  the  Surveyor  General  of  Oregon,  and  the  same 
were  opened  for  settlement.  The  Modocs  went  upon  the 
Klamath  Reservation,  according  to  the  stipulations  of  the 
treaty,  but  not  to  remain.  They  soon  went  back  to  their 
former  haunts,  alleging  dissatisfaction  with  their  treatment 
at  the  hands  of  the  United  States  Indian  Agent.  They 
made  their  homes  at  different  points  to  suit  their  conveni 
ence  and  their  roving  dispositions.  The  country  having 
now  become  partially  occupied  by  settlers  under  the  pre 
emption  acts  of  Congress,  these  Indians  began  a  system  of 
petty  annoyances  to  the  settlers  .with  the  evident  intention 
of  inducing  them  to  abandon  their  settlements.  They 
would  visit  houses  in  the  absence  of  the  male  members  of 
the  family  and  demand  that  the  women  should,  at  unrea 
sonable  hours,  cook  food  for  their  parties,  which  they  gen 
erally  did,  at  great  hardship  and  expense,  for  the  sake  of 
peace.  The  Modocs  claimed  the  ownership  of  all  the  lands 
which  they  had  sold,  and  demanded  of  the  settlers  rents,  for 
occupancy,  and  compensation  for  cutting  grass,  grazing,  etc., 
which  demands  were  complied  with  for  the  purpose  of 
preserving  peace.  This  conduct  caused  many  settlers  to 
leave  their  claims,  and  with  their  families  leave  the  coun- 


6  MODOC    WAR. 


try.  But  the  settlers  who  remained,  generally  maintained 
friendly  relations  with  the  Modocs,  notwithstanding  their 
bad  conduct  and  unlawful  presence  and  exactions. 

The  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs  for  Oregon  made 
frequent,  but  unsuccessful,  attempts  to  induce  these  Indi 
ans  by  peaceable  means  to  go  upon  their  Reservation.  In 
the  month  of  November,  1872,  the  Superintendent  having 
personally  conferred  with  the  Indian  Department,  at 
Washington,  proceeded  to  Link  river,  in  the  Klamath. 
country,  for  the  purpose  of  requiring  the  Modocs  to  com 
ply  with  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty.  At  this  time  the 
Modocs  were  camped  in  three  separate  bands  as  follows  : 
Capt.  Jack,  with  several  warriors  and  their  families  about 
three  miles  from  the  mouth  of  Lost  river,  on  the  west 
side;  Hooker  Jim,  a  petty  chief,  with  his  band,  occupied 
the  shore  of  Tule  Lake,  east  of  the  mouth  of  Lost  river, 
in  Oregon;  the  Hot  Creek  band  were  camped  on  the  south 
side  of  Little  Klarnath  Lake,  in  California,  some  twenty- 
five  miles  from  Capt.  Jack's  band,  in  a  southwesterly  di 
rection. 

On  the  27th  day  of  November,  1872,  the  Superintend 
ent  having  failed,  by  peaceable  means  to  induce  Captain 
Jack  to  assent  to  a  return  to  the  reservation,  addressed  a 
letter  to  the  officer  in  command  at  Fort  Klamath,  stating 
that  the  Modoc  Indians  defiantly  declined  to  meet  him  ac 
cording  to  his  request,  and  declared  that  they  would  not  go 
upon  the  Reservation,  and  made  the  following  requisition: 
"  In  order,  therefore,  to  carry  out  instructions  from  the  Com 
missioner  of  Indian  Affairs,  I  have  to  request  that  you  at 
ojce  furnish  a  sufficient  force  to  compel  said  Indians  to  go 
to  Camp  Yainax,  on  said  Reservation,  where  I  have  made 
provision  for  their  subsistence."  [See  enclosure  "A."] 

Previous  to  this  time,    upon  being  advised  by  the  Su- 


MODOC    WAR. 


perintendent  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  put  these  Indi 
ans  upon  the  Reservation,  Gen.  Canby  placed  all  the  military 
force  and  material  of  the  United  States  inthat  section  of 
country  under  the  control  of  the  senior  officer  ot  that  dis 
trict,  Lieut.  Col.  Frank  Wheaton,  21st  U.  S.  Infantry,  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  the  removal  of  the  Modocs  by 
force,  it  need  be  ;  at  the  same  time  indicating  that  the 
time  and  manner  of  the  removal  had  not  been  deter 
mined,  but  that  he  should  be  prepared  for  the  possibility 
that  the  attempt  to  remove  them  might  result  in  hostili 
ties,  and  that  he  should,  in  that  event,  act  promptly  for  the 
protection  of  the  frontier.  The  force  specially  designated 
to  this  duty  consisted  of  four  companies  of  cavalry  and 
three  of  infantry,  distributed  among  the  garrisons  at  Fort 
Klamath,  Camp  Warner  and  Camp  Harney,  in  Oregon, 
and  Camp  Bidwell,  in  California,  [See  inclosure  "B,"  let 
ter  of  General  Canby  to  Governor  of  Oregon.]  ]None  of 
these  posts  were  within  immediate  supporting  distance  to 
Fort  Klamath,  and  the  force  at  the  latter  post  was  en 
tirely  inadequate  to  the  duty  contemplated. 

At  this  point  two  very  incomprehensible  and  disastrous 
circumstances  occurred. 

1st,  The  order  of  the  Indian  Department  for  the  re 
moval  of  the  Modocs  by  force  was  not  delivered  to  the 
officer  specially  designated  by  Gen.  Canby  for  that  duty  ; 
and, 

2d,  ~No  notice  whatever  was  given  to  the  neighboring 
settlers  that  difficulties  were  pending. 

The  result  was  that  on  the  29th  day  of  November,  1872, 
a  small  detachment  of  troops,  thirty -five  men,  under  com 
mand  of  Captain  James  Jackson,  approached  Captain 
Jack's  camp,  early  in  the  morning,  and  demanded  that  he 
surrender  and  go  upon  the  reservation,  according  to  the 


MODOC    WAR. 


terms  of  the  treaty.  This  was  refused,  and  upon  further 
demand  the  tsoops  were  fired  upon  by  the  Indians.  Upon 
this  first  fire  one  citizen,  happening  to  be  present,  and 
who  was  not  aware  of  the  circumstances,  was  killed. 
During,  and  subsequent  to  the  affair  between  the  com 
mand  of  Capt.  Jackson  and  the  baud  on  the  west  side  of 
Lost  river,  under  Capt.  Jack,  the  Indians  under  Hooker 
Jim,  on  the  shore  of  Tule  Lake,  east  of  the  mouth  of  Lost 
river,  scattered  in  small  parties  among  the  isolated  settle 
ments  for  twenty -five  miles  around  and  massacred  eighteen 
unoffending  and  unsuspecting  citizens  and  sacked  and 
destroyed  their  residences,  and  drove  off  their  cattle  and 
horses.  This  work  of  butchery  and  pillage  lasted  for  two 
days.  Eleven  citizens  were  murdered  on  the  29th  and 
seven  on  the  30th  of  November,  by  the  savages  under 
the  lead  of  Hooker  Jim.  This  band  had  not  been  ap 
proached  by  the  soldiery.  Capt.  Jack's  band,  after  the 
fight,  fled  south  on  the  west  side  of  Tule  Lake  to  the  Lava 
Beds,  along  the  rocky  ridges  not  inhabited,  and  therefore 
committed  no  murder  in  their  flight.  The  Hot  Creek 
band,  on  the  south  side  of  Little  Xlamath,  took  no  part  in 
the  massacre  of  settlers,  but  appeared  to  be  friendly  and 
expressed  a  willingness  to  go  upon  the  Reservation.  Im 
mediately  after  the  massacre  steps  were  taken  to  have  this 
band  return  to  the  Reservation,  but  owing  to  the  great  and 
natural  excitement  in  the  country  it  was  thought  best  by 
Gen.  Canby  to  have  protection  for  these  Indians. 

In  the  meantime  dismay  spread  throughout  the  settle 
ments  of  Southern  Oregon,  and  a  demand,  was  made  by 
the  people  upon  the  Governor  for  troops  to  protect  the 
living  and  bury  the  dead.  A  Volunteer  company  of 
citizens  was  raised  immediately;  public  meetings  were 
held,  and  urgent  calls  upon  the  Governor  for  orders  au- 


MODOC    WAR. 


thorizing  the  recognition  of  their  services.  Temporary 
orders  were  given  with  direction  to  act  in  conjunction  with 
the  regular  troops.  [See  inclosure  "C."] 

On  the  2d  of  December  the  Governor  received  a  tele 
gram  from  the  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs  at  Jack 
sonville  that  assistance  was  needed  at  Klamath,  that  the 
citizens  were  without  arms,  and  requesting  the  forwarding 
of  one  hundred  latest  improved  muskets.  [See  inclosure 
«D."] 

At  this  time  there  had  been  no  concentration  of  troops 
to  the  point  of  disturbance,  and  there  was  no  available 
force  of  United  States  troops  ready  for  immediate  action 
in  the  Klamath  Lake  Basin.  Col.  John  E.  Ross,  of  Jack 
son  county,  was  by  telegram  appointed  Brigadier  General 
of  the  First  Brigade  of  Oregon  Militia,  and  instructed  to 
do  all  that  was  proper  in  the  emergency,  but  to  see  to  it 
that  when  sufficient  force  of  United  States  troops  should 
reach  the  field,  to  withdraw  the  Volunteers.  [See  inclo 
sure  "E."]  Gen.  Ross  promptly  accepted  the  commis 
sion  and  entered  upon  his  duty. 

A  letter  was  despatched  to  Maj.  Gen.  E.  R.  S.  Canby 
commanding  this  department,  informing  him  of  these  cir 
cumstances,  and  soliciting  instant  action  on  the  part  of  the 
regular  forces.  [See  inclosure  UF."]  Gen.  Canby  res 
ponded,  sending  copies  of  his  orders,  directing  all  avail 
able  force  in  the  district  to  be  placed  in  the  field  to  pro 
tect  the  settlements  and  to  chastise  the  savages.  The  Hot 
Creek  band  of  Modocs,  numbering  about  forty,  men, 
women  and  children,  on  the  6th  of  December,  had  not  yet 
joined  the  hostiles,  and  being  not  implicated  in  the  mur 
ders  which  had  been  committed  were  expected  to  arrive 
at  Yreka,  California,  to  be  transported  to  the  Klamath 
Reservation  via  Rogue  River  Valley,  Oregon,  and  owing 


10  MODOC    WAR. 


to  the  excited  condition  of  the  country  a  force  was  re 
quested  by  Gen.  Can  by  for  their  escort.  Having  no  dis 
posable  force  himself  he  made  requisition  on  the  Governor 
of  Oregon  for  assistance,  at  the  same  time  stating  that  the 
band  under  Capt.  Jack,  and  all  those  implicated  in  the 
murder  of  citizens,  would  be  captured  and  crushed  out, 
and  all  the  murderers  would  be  turned  ever  to  the  civil 
authorities  for  trial  and  punishment. 

The  policy  affecting  the  murderers  of  the  citizens  had 
been  agreed  upon  by  the  Governor  and  Gen.  Can  by  in  a 
personal  interview.  In  response  to  this  requisition  Gen. 
Ross  w^as  ordered  to  use  his  authority  and  influence  to 
place  the  peaceable  Hot  Creek's  on  the  Reservation,  but 
on  the  night  of  the  5th  ot  December,  after  the  wagons 
and  teams  had  been  prepared  for  their  transportation  to 
the  Reservation,  by  way  of  Yreka  and  Rogue  River  Val 
ley,  and  after  having  promised  to  go  peaceably,  the  whole 
band  stole  away  in  the  night  time  and  fled  to  the  Lava 
Beds  to  join  Capt.  Jack,  and  from  that  time  worked  and 
fought  with  him  throughout  the  war.  [See  inclosure  "G."] 

Gen.  Ross'  force  was  small — two  companies — Company 
A,  Capt.  Harrison  Kelly,  and  Company  B,  Capt.  Oliver  C. 
Applegate.  He  arrived  in  the  Klamath  Lake  Basin  on 
the  9th  of  December.  At  this  time  no  United  States 
troops  had  arrived  at  the  scene  of  the  late  massacre. 
Gen.  Ross'  first  work  was  to  place  his  men  in  position  to 
cut  off  communication  between  the  hostiles  and  the  reser 
vation  Indians,  then  to  dispatch  a  force  to  seek  for  sur 
vivors  of  the  Lost  river  settlement,  and  to  bury  the  dead, 
whose  bodies  had  now  lain  exposed  to  beasts  of  prey, 
without  sepulture,  for  ten  days. 

This  sad  duty  performed,  he  proceeded,  according  to  in 
structions,  to  offer  his  services  in  co-operation  with  the 


MODOC    WAK.  11 


regular  troops  who  had  now  begun  to  arrive  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Lava  Beds,  from  the  several  distant  posts  in  the 
District.  The  United  States  officer  in  command  received 
Gen.  Eoss  cordially  and  issued  an  order  for  his  co-opera 
tion.  [See  inclosure  "H,"  Gen.  Ross'  Report,  and  Orders 
of  U.  S.  officer.] 

The  field  of  operations  being  crossed  by  the  boundary 
line  between  Oregon  and  California,  and  the  hostile  In 
dians  having  taken  refuge  in  the  pedrigal  situated  wholly 
in  California,  General  Ross'  services,  from  this  period, 
during  his  first  campaign  against  the  Modocs,  were  en 
tirely  within  the  State  of  California,  for  the  purpose  of 
dislodging  an  enemy  infesting  our  borders,  but  acting  un 
der  orders  of  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

The  volunteer  services  on  the  part  of  the  State  of  Ore 
gon  were  intended  to  meet  a  pressing  emergency  in  the  ab 
sence  of  regular  troops.  On  the  16th  of  December,  therefore, 
the  Governor  issued  an  order  to  General  Ross  to  muster  the 
volunteers  out  of  service  in  case  a  force  of  United  States 
troops  sufficient  for  the  protection  of  the  southern  frontier 
had  taken  the  field.  But  he  was  instructed  to  use  his  dis 
cretion  as  to  whether  the  emergency  of  the  case  required 
the  further  presence  of  the  State  troops.  [See  inclosure  "I."] 

On  the  arrival  of  Lieut.  Col.  Frank  Wheaton,  the  officer 
in  command  of  the  District  of  the  Lakes,  he  fully  approved 
the  action  of  Major  John  Green  in  inviting  the  co-opera 
tion  of  the  Oregon  Militia,  and  in  his  General  Field  Order 
No.  1 ,  assigned  General  Ross  to  duty  as  a  part  of  the  force 
designated  to  make  the  main  attack  upon  Captain  Jack's 
stronghold  in  the  Lava  Rocks.  [See  inclosure  "  J."] 

This  order  contemplated  the  delay  of  several  days  for 
preparation  for  the  attack.  The  Oregon  Volunteers  hav 
ing  been  mustered  for  a  sudden  emergency  only,  and  be- 


12  MODOC     WAR. 


ing  without  tents,  and  without  a  sufficient  supply  of 
blankets  and  rations  lor  further  service,  and  being  too  far 
distant  from  their  base  of  supplies  for  being  supplied  in 
these  particulars  by  the  State,  these  facts  were  made 
known  to  Col.  Wheaton.  This  officer  immediately  gave 
orders  for  the  issue  to  Gen.  Ross'  command  such  blankets 
and  other  supplies  as  he  had  at  command,  for  the  imme 
diate  relief  of  the  Volunteers,  with  the  understanding  that 
they  should  continue  in  the  field  until  the  concerted  attack 
upon  the  Modocs.  This  arrangement  was  acted  upon. 
[See  inclosure  "K."] 

Before  receiving  the  reports  of  General  Ross  as  to  the 
concerted'  movement  upon  the  Modocs,  and  being  uncer 
tain  of  the  condition  of  the  settlements,  and  of  the  Volun 
teer  service,  by  order  of  the  Governor  of  January  7,  1873, 
Major  General  John  F.  Miller,  of  the  Oregon  Militia,  was 
directed  to  make  a  visit  of  observation  to  the  southern 
frontier,  to  distribute  arms  among  the  settlers  and  to  mus 
ter  the  Volunteers  out  of  service  on  ascertaining  that  regu 
lar  troops  had  occupied  the  field  in  sufficient  force  to  pro 
tect  the  settlements  and  chastise  the  savages.  Gen.  Miller 
found  the  Volunteers  in  hearty  co-operation  with  the 
regular  troops,  and  that  Col.  Wheaton  desired  them  to 
remain  in  the  field  under  his  orders  until  after  the  pending 
attack,  which  was  confidently  expected  to  be  final.  Gen. 
Miller  coincided  with  the  views  of  Col.  Wheaton,  and  re 
mained  himself,  and  took  an  active  part  in  the  battle  of 
the  Lava  Beds  of  the  17th  of  January.  [See  inclosure  "L," 
Gen.  Miller's  Report.] 

The  issue  of  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  stores  to 
the  Volunteers  were  duly  reported  by  Col.  Wheaton  to  Gen. 
Canby,  and  by  him  approved;  and  the  same  were  finally 
approved  by  the  decision  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  the 


MODOC    WAR.  13 


following  words;  "As  it  appears  that  the  issues  to  the 
Oregon  Volunteer  Militia,  made  by  order  of  Col.  Wheaton, 
were  sanctioned  by  Gen.  Canby,  and  were  necessary  to 
prevent  the  men  from  suffering  when  cordially  co-opera- 
ating  with  the  United  States  troops,  while  under  the  ex 
igencies  of  the  service  their  numbers  were  inadequate  for 
the  protection  of  the  settlements  against  Indian  attacks, 
the  Secretary  of  War  approves  the  action  of  Col. 
Wheaton."  [See  inclosure  UM,"  a  certified  copy  of  said 
decision.] 

On  the  17th  of  January  the  first  general  engagement 
was  fought  with  the  Modocs.  This  battle  was  well  con 
tested  under  the  circumstances;  and  though  not  successful, 
it  clearly  exposed  the  difficulties  of  the  field  and  the  char 
acter  of  the  enemy. 

General  Canby  having  ordered  out  all  the  available 
regular  force  in  Oregon  and  California  to  reinforce  Col. 
Wheaton,  and  having  informed  the  Governor  that  he  had 
no  doubt  that  he  would  be  able  to  protect  the  frontier  and 
subdue  the  Modocs,  the  Volunteers  were  withdrawn  from 
the  field  and  were  mustered  out  of  service  as  expeditiously 
as  possible.  [See  inclosure  "2sT."] 

During  this  expedition  the  Oregon  Volunteers  not  only 
served  under  the  command  of  regular  officers  of  the 
United  States,  but  they  were  detailed  to  perform  escort 
duty  in  regular  transportation,  and  their  teams  and  wagons 
being  light  and  serviceable  in  a  muddy  region,  were  used 
in  connection  with  regular  army  transportation  to  good 
advantage.  In  fact,  there  was  a  blending  of  the  Volun 
teers  with  the  regular  force. 

SECOND  EXPEDITION  OF  THE  OKEGON  MILITIA. 
The  second  service  of  the  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia, 


14  MODOC    WAR. 


composed  of  Company  C.,  Captain  Joseph  H.  Hyzer, 
Company  D.,  Captain  Thomas  Mulholland,  and  Company 
E.,  Captain  George  R.  Rodgers,  was  called  into  reqisition 
in  the  month  of  April,  after  a  period  of  very  unsettled 
feeling,  growing  out  of  doubts  in  the  minds  of  all  frontier 
settlers  as  to  the  results  of  pending  negotiations  for  peace 
with  the  Modoc  savages,  without  first  subduing  them,  or 
demanding  the  surrender  of  the  perpetrators  ot  the  mas 
sacre  of  the  29th  and  30th  of  November.  When  these 
negotiations  were  abruptly  terminated  by  the  double  per 
fidy  of  the  savages,  and  the  assassination  of  Gen.  Canbj^ 
and  Commissioner  Thomas,  the  whole  country  exposed  to 
the  raids  of  the  Modocs,  became  excited  with  the  dread  of 
more  massacres.  The  regular  forces  which  had  been  con- 

O 

cent  rated  near  the  Lava  Beds  were  not  disposed  by  the 
new  commander,  Col.  Gillem,  with  any  reference  to  giving 
protection  to  the  Oregon  frontier.  All  the  available  regu 
lar  force  in  the  Department  of  the  Columbia  had  been 
ordered  to  the  support  of  Col.  Gillem,  so  that  there  was 
not,  at  the  time  of  calling  these  companies  into  service,  a 
single  company  of  regular  troops  in  the  State  of  Oregon, 
while  its  eastern  and  southern  settlements  were  exposed 
to  the  dangers  of  a  general  Indian  outbreak.  Gen.  Ross, 
in  his  report  of  the  second  Volunteer  service  remarks  upon 
this  point  as  follows:  "Let  us  now  pause  for  a  moment 
and  consider  the  condition  of  the  settlements  of  Southeast 
ern  Oregon.  The  massacre  of  the  Peace  Commissioners 
was,  of  course,  the  signal  for  the  renewal  of  Indian  hos 
tilities.  If  the  Modocs  should  fall  back  from  the  Lava 
Beds,  the  settlements  referred  to  would  be  at  the  mercy 
of  the  Indians.  Or,  if  the  Indians  on  the  Klamath  Reser 
vation,  who  had  thus  far  remained  friendly,  should  deter 
mine  to  join  the  hostiles,  of  which  there  was  great  danger, 


MODOC    WAR.  15 


their  first  movement  would  be  to  murder  the  settlers,  burn 
their  houses  and  drive  off  their  stock.  It  will  thus  be 
seen  that  the  southeastern  portion  of  the  State  was  in  con 
stant  and  imminent  peril;  for  upon  the  happening  of 
either  or  both  the  contingencies  referred  to,  the  settle 
ments  in  that  section  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  Indian 
cruelty  and  rapacity.  Under  these  circumstances  an  ade 
quate  military  force  in  the  Lake  Basin,  to  prevent  by  their 
presence  an  outbreak  on  the  part  of  the  Indians  on  the 
Reservation,  and  also  to  protect  the  settlements  from  the 
hostile  Modocs,  became  an  indispensable  necessity." 
[See  inclosure  "O,"  Gen.  Ross'  report  of  second  service.] 

The  first  applications  on  the  part  of  the  people  for  a 
second  call  for  troops  were  denied  by  the  Governor,  but 
becoming  satisfied  that  the  Klamath  Reservation  Indians 
were  no  longer  trustworthy,  and  that  the  peril  demanding 
action  was  imminent,  a  call  was  made. 

The  massacre  of  the  Peace  Commissioners  occurred  on 
the  llth  day  of  April,  1873,  and  Col.  Gillem  immediately 
commenced  an  attack  upon  the  Indians  in  the  Lava  Beds. 
The  engagement  lasted  three  days,  resulting  in  routing 
the  savages  from  their  first  stronghold,  only  to  have  them 
fall  back  to  another,  which  gave  them  access  to  the  Lost 
River  country,  and  the  Klamath  region,  and  exposed  all 
the  settlements  of  Southeastern  Oregon  to  their  raids.  At 
this  time  the  Indians  on  the  Klamath  Reservation,  who 
had  been  armed  by  authority  of  the  agent,  were  threaten 
ing  an  outbreak.  Col.  Gillem  sent  out  couriers  to  warn 
settlers  and  to  stop  communications,  except  by  way  of 
Yreka,  California.  Other  Indians  were  making  demon 
strations  of  hostility.  It  now  appeared  that  a  general  In 
dian  war  of  serious  magnitude  could  only  be  prevented  by 
throwing  a  force  of  Volunteers  into  the  field  north  of  the 


16  MODOC    WAR. 


California  line,  to  intercept  communication  between  the 
Modocs  and  the  Klamath  Reservation,  and  with  the  Snake 
and  Piute  Indians.  The  three  companies  already  men 
tioned  were  authorized  by  the  Governor  and  directed  to 
open  the  road  from  Jacksonville  to  the  Lake  Basin,  and 
to  go  at  once  to  the  relief  of  the  endangered  settlers.  [See 
inclosure  "P."] 

On  learning  that  a  force  of  Volunteers  had  been  or 
dered  to  the  Klamath  country,  the  U.  S.  Indian  Agent  at 
the  Klamath  Agency,  L.  S.  Dyar,  addressed  a  letter  to 
Gen.  Ross  in  which  he  said:  "I  respectfully  request  that 
you  send  a  strong  detachment  to  Yainax,  (on  the  Klam 
ath  Reservation.)  Such  a  course  would,  I  think,  not  only 
protect  the  settlers  on  Upper  Sprague  River,  but  would 
do  more  to  prevent  a  general  outbreak  than  anything  else 
perhaps  that  you  could  do,  as  it  would  almost  insure  quiet 
among  the  Snakes  and  Modocs  now  there,  and  prevent  a 
raid  upon  that  place  by  Captain  Jack.  A  successful  raid 
upon  Yainax  would  nearly  double  Captian  Jack's  war 
riors.  Will  you  not  represent  this  matter  to  Governor 
Grover."  [Inclosure  "Q."] 

There  being  no  regular  troops  in  Oregon  at  this  time, 
there  was  great  apprehension  of  an  outbreak  of  the 
armed  Reservation  Indians,  and  of  a  general  hostile 
uprising  of  the  neighboring  tribes  of  the  southern  border. 
The  condition  of  the  settlers  of  the  Lake  Basin  was  now 
considered  most  critical.  The  hostile  Modocs  on  one  side 
and  the  threatening  Reservation  Indians  upon  the  other,  so 
impressed  the  settlers  with  the  danger  of  their  situation 
that  they  were  abandoning  their  homes,  removing  their 
stock  and  property  and  fleeing  out  of  the  country.  [See 
iuclosure  "R."] 

The  Indian  Agent  removed  his  family  from  the  Klam- 


MODOC  WAR.  17 

ath  Reservation  and  left  the  place  himself.  The  air  was 
filled  with  dangerous  rumors,  and  the  most  discreet  and 
temperate  men  considered  general  hostilties  imminent. 
A  false  step  at  this  juncture  would  have  precipitated  a 
general  outbreak.  The  arrival  of  the  Volunteers,  there- 
tore,  appeared  to  be  a  most  opportune  lelief.  As  to  dis 
arming  the  Indians  on  the  reservation  the  Governor's  in 
structions  to  Gen.  Ross  were:  "Great  care  must  be  taken 
upon  this  question,  not  to  move  prematurely  for  disarming 
any  Indians  by  indiscreet  action,  or  by  such  movements 
as  will  excite  hostilities  that  cannot  be  controlled  by  the 
force  present.  The  policy  is  to  arm  the  settlers,  and  by  a 
small  and  active  force  to  assist  in  their  defence  until  the 
United  States  can  furnish  troops  for  that  purpose."  [See 
inclosure  "EV] 

Gen.  Ross  moved  with  caution  and  discretion.  [See 
inclosure  S.] 

He  dispatched  Company  D,  for  the  protection  of  the 
settlers  of  Drew's  Valley,  and  the  Valleys  of  Goose  Lake, 
Chevvaucan  and  Summer  Lake,  these  being  in  great 
danger  from  raiding  parties  of  Captain  Jack's  Indians, 
who  were  now  scattering  from  the  Lava  Beds. 

Companies  E  and  C  were  stationed  at  different  points  in 
the  settlements,  west  of  those  above  named,  and  were 
employed  in  scouting  the  country  so  as  to  make  their 
presence  and  their  object  known  both  to  the  friendly  and 
to  the  hostile  Indians.  In  the  meantime,  on  the  2d  of 
May,  Gen.  Jefferson  C.  Davis,  having  been  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Columbia,  ar 
rived  at  the  Lava  Beds  and  took  personal  command  of 
the  U.  S.  forces  operating  against  the  Modocs.  Shortly 
after  this  vigorous  movements  against  Captain  Jack  were 
apparent,  and  a  successful  onslaught  was  made  by  the 
BM 


18  MUDOC  WAR. 


regulars  upon  his  camp  on  sSora-**  Lake,  0:1  the  10th 
of  May,  with  the  U.  S.  forces  operating  in  his  front,  with 
the  Oregon  Militia  cutting  off  his  communication  with 
the  Rescr.'ation  Indians,  the  Piutes  and  the  Snakes,  and 
finally,  with  disaffection  in  his  own  ranks,  his  desperate 
alternative  was  fight  or  surrender.  The  closing  events  of 
the  Volunteer  service  are  thus  reported  by  Gen.  Ross: 

"Learning  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  May  that 
Captain  Jack,  with  a  portion  of  his  warriors,  had  made 
their  escape  fjom  the  Lava  Beds,  and  gone  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Langell  Valley,  I  started  immediately  with  Capt. 
Uyzer's  Company,  accompanied  by  my  staff,  and  arrived 
at  the  eastern  end  of  the  valley  refenedto  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  31st.  Soon  after  going  into  camp  a  scouting 
party  was  sent  out  with  orders  to  examine  the  ground  for 
sign  of  the  fugitive  Modocs,  and  after  a  short  absence  the 
party  returned,  reporting  the  discovery  of  fresh  Indian 
tracks  on  the  mountain  south  of  our  camp.  Thereupon  I 
immediately  dispatched  1st  Lieut.  Lindsay,  of  Company 
C,  with  twenty  picked  men  to  occupy  the  summit  of  the 
mountain  referred  to,  with  orders  to  keep  a  sharp  watch 
for  Indians,  to  capture  all  he  discovered,  and  to  shoot 
down  all  that  refused  to  surrender.  Meanwhile  having 
learned  that  Maj.  John  Green,  U.  S.  A.,  with  his  com 
mand  was  camped  some  four  miles  east  of  me,  I  dis 
patched  a  courier  to  him  next  morning  to  inform  him  of 
my  whereabouts  and  of  the  discovery  made  on  the  even 
ing  previous.  In  a  short  time  Maj.  Green  came  to  my 
camp,  and  expressed  a  desire  that  my  troops  act  in  concert 
with  those  of  the  United  States  in  capturing  the  fugitive 
Modocs.  A  party  of  those  Indians  were  believed  to  be 
in  the  vicinity  of  a  small  lake  in  the  mountains,  ten  miles 
eouth  of  our  camp  A  plan  of  co-operation  for  the  cap- 


MODOC  WAR.  19 


ture  of  these  Indians  was  agreed  upon  between  Maj. 
Green  and  myself;  in  pursuance  of  which  both  commands 
moved  by  different  routes  at  midnight,  on  the  1st  of  June, 
Jor  the  point  referred  to.  My  troops  being  the  first  to 
arrive  at  the  place  designated,  and  discovering  fresh 
Indian  tracks,  started  immediately  in  pursuit  and  followed 
the  trail  until  night  corning  on  they  were  compelled  to 
camp.  As  soon  as  day  dawned  next  morning  the  pursuit 
was  resumed  and  kept  up  all  day  over  an  extremely  rough 
country.  At  dark  the  Indians  were  overtaken  and  cap 
tured.  The  captives  numbered  12,  among  whom  was  the 
notorious  'Black  Jim,'  one  of  the  murderers  of  Gen. 
Can by. 

"  Next  day,  June  4th,  I  sent  a  message  to  Gen.  Green, 
informing  him  of  the  captures  we  had  made,  and  also  for 
warded  a  dispaich  to  your  Excellency  upon  the  same 
subject.  In  reply  I  received  a  note  from  Maj.  Green,  re 
questing  me  to  send  my  captives  to  an  island  in  Tule 
Lakr,  at  which  all  the  Indian  prisoners  were  being  col 
lected.  (See  copy  of  his  letter  hereunto  attached.)  I  also 
received  a  telegram  from  your  Excellency,  containing  in 
structions  in  regard  to  the  same  subject.  In  obedience  to 
these  orders  I  took  immediate  steps  to  ascertain  if  any  of 
these  Indians  stood  indicted  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Jack 
son  County,  for  the  murder  of  the  Lost  River  settlers,  and 
having  become  satisfied  that  none  of  them  were  con 
cerned  in  that  massacre,  I  proceeded  with  my  captives  to 
the  island  referred  to,  and  delivered  them  up  to  the  com 
manding  officer  of  the  U.  S.  troops  at  that  place." 

The  Modoc  war  now  being  brought  to  a  successful  ter 
mination  by  the  capture  of  Captain  Jack,  and  the  princi 
pal  portion  of  his  warriors,  and  there  being  no  further 
necessity  for  any  troops  in  the  field,  I  issued  a  general 


20  MODOC  WAR. 


order  that  they  proceed  at  once  to  the  respective  places  at 
which  they  were  enrolled  and*  be  mustered  out  of 
service. 

Accompanying  herewith  I  transmit  six  muster  rolls, 
numbered  from  one  to  six  inclusive,  being  as  follows: 

1st,  Muster  Roll  of  General  Field  and  Staff  Officers. 

2d,  Muster  Roll  of  Company  "A." 

3d,  "  "          UB." 

4th,  "  "          "C." 

5th,  "  "          "D." 

6th,  "  "          "E." 

I  also  transmit  herewith  an  "abstract  of  indebtedness  of 
State  of  Oregon  on  account  of  expenses  of  Modoc  war  of 
1872-3." 

FIRST  SERVICE. 

Also  "abstract  of  indebtedness  of  State  of  Oregon,  on 
account  of  expenses  of  suppressing  Indian  hostilities,"  etc. 

MODOC  WAR— SECOND  SERVICE. 

Amounting  respectively  to  the  sums  of $  60,826  55  J 

69,901  88J 

Amounting  in  the  aggregate  to $130,728  44 

Col.  Jesse  Baker,  Quartermaster  General,  and  Col.  J.  N. 
T.  Miller,  Commissary  General,  gave  their  personal  atten 
tion  to  much  of  the  duties  pertaining  to  their  several 
departments.  Maj.  Quincy  A.  Brooks,  Assistant  Quarter 
master  General  has  had  personal  supervision  of  closing  the 
accounts.  I  believe  that  the  service  has  been  conducted 
with  prudence  and  integrity.  Col.  Miller  was  with  the 
Volunteer  troops  throughout  the  first  service,  and  has 
furnished  me  with  many  important  facts  relating  to  he 


MODOC  WAR.  21 

same.     Copies  of  subordinate  abstracts,  returns  and  vouch 
ers,  will  be  furnished  upon  request. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

L.  F.  GROVEK, 

Governor  of  Oregon. 

STATE  OF  OREGON,  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  ) 
Salem,  February  13,  1874.  f 


MODOC  WAK.  23 


REPORT 


OF 


MAJOR  GENERAL  JOHN  F.  MILLER 


TO 

GOVERNOR  GROVER, 


HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  THE  LAKES, 
And  of  the  U.  S.  Troops  and  Oregon 
Volunteer    Militia   operating    in    thd  • 
Modoc  country.  f 

^  near  Van  Bremen  Ranch, 

January  20,  1873.  J 

To  his  Excellency,  L.  F.  Grocer,  Governor  of  Oregon  : 

SIR  —  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that,  in  conformity 
with  the  General  Field  Order  2s"o.  3,  issued  hy  Brevet 
Major  General  Frank  Wheaton,  U.  S.  A.,  Commanding 
District  of  the  Lakes,  a  copy  of  which  is  herewith  enclosed, 
the  Modoc  position  was  attacked  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  17th  inst.,  by  the  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia,  under 
Brigadier  General  J.  E.  Ross.  Two  companies,  "A,"  Cap 
tain  Harrison  Kelly,  and  "B,"  Captain  O.  C.  Applegate, 
each  number'.ng  some  sixty  men,  including  twenty  Indian 
scouts  belonging  to  company"B,"  and  an  independent 
company  of  California  volunteers,  twenty-five  in  number 
(Captain  John  A.  Fairchilds),  co-operating  with  about 


24  MODOC  WAR. 


two  hundred  and  fifty  troops  of  the  Ui.itetl  States  under 
Brevet  Major  General  Frank  Wheaton,  U.  S.  A.  The 
engagement  begun  at  8:30  A.M.,  and  continued  until  dark, 
and,  owing  to  the  position  of  the  enemy,  which  it  was 
impossible  to  forsee  or  provide  against,  resulted  in  the 
discomfiture  of  our  attacking  forces,  with  a  loss  of  about 
forty  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  including  two  killed  of 
the  Oregon  Volunteers. 

The  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia,  under  General  Ross,  in 
order  to  accomplish  the  most  effective  service,  have,  since 
the  commencement  of  operations  against  the  Modocs, 
placed  themselves  under  the  direction  and  command  of 
General  Wheaton,  an  officer  of  great  ability  and  expe 
rience. 

From  the  most  reliable  information  at  my  command  I 
estimate  the  number  of  hostile  Indians  at  not  less  than 
one  hundred  and  fifty  warriors,  and,  from  information 
derived  from  scouting  parties  and  others,  and  which  I 
deem  reliable,  many  of  their  females  fight  with  a  despe 
ration  and  courage  equal  to  that  of  the  males. 

Their  position  is  in  what  is  known  as  the  "Lava  Bed," 
an  immense  plain  of  volcanic  rock,  cut  and  broken  with 
fissures,  canyons  and  chasms,  on  the  south  of  Tule  Lake, 
about  ten  miles  south  of  the  boundary  line  between  Oregon 
and  California.  It  is  one  of  great  strength,  and  difficult 
of  approach.  It  is  the  opinion  of  General  Wheaton,  and 
Majors  Green  and  Mason,  that  it  will  require  one  thous 
and  men,  with  mortars  and  provisions  for  a  siege  of  per 
haps  many  days,  to  dislodge  and  capture  them;  and,  from 
my  own  observation,  I  concur  iii  their  opinion. 

The  home  of  these  Indians  is  in  Oregon.  The  scene 
of  their  depredations  is  along  the  border  of  either  of  the 
States  of  Oregon  and  California,  and  their  victims  are  the 


MODOC  WAR.  25 


defenseless  citizens  of  both  States.  Settlers,  not  longer 
since  than  last  summer,  have  been  terrified  by  insults  to 
their  families,  and  the  fear  of  massacre,  into  removing 
from  the  country,  while  others  have  been  compelled  to  pro 
cure  temporary  immunity  by  giving  them  certificates  of 
good  character  and  gratuities  of  iood.  One  settler,  Henry 
Miller,  was  massacred  by  them  within  a  tew  months  after 
having  given  such  a  certificate.  They  must  be  conquered 
and  removed  to  distant  Reservations,  or  the  country  here 
abandoned  to  them.  I  am  satisfied  that  no  force,  that  it 
would  be  practicable  to  place  upon  our  frontier,  could 
entirely  protect  it  from  their  raids,  and  the  withdrawal  of 
the  force  now  here  would  invite  them  to  renewed  rob 
beries  and  massacre. 

The  term  of  enlistment,  of  the  Oregon  Volunteers  now 
here,  has,  with  a  few  exceptions,  expired,  and,  within  a  few 
days,  they  will  be  mustered  out  of  service. 

General  Wheaton,  if  supported  by  the  proper  authority, 
will  put  an  end  to  Indian  troubles  in  this  vicinity  for  all 
future  time.  He  has  gained  information,  by  the  move 
ment  of  the  17th  inst.,  of  the  position  of  these  Indians 
that  is  indispensable  to  successful  operations  against  them, 
and  that  could  only  be  obtained  by  a  reconnoisance  in 
force.  His  coolness  and  excellent  judgment  in  the  affair 
of  the  "Lava  Beds"  were  conspicuous  throughout.  The 
same  honorable  mention  is  due  to  Majors  John  Green  and 
E.  C.  Mason,  both,  like  General  Wheaton,  veterans  of  the 
late  war,  and  the  former  a  man  of  large  experience  in 
Indian  fighting  with  General  Crook,  Colonels  David  Perry 
and  R.  F.  Bernard,  Captains  J.  Q.  Adams,  G.  H.  Burton 
and  James  Jackson,  Lieutenants  Ross,  Rheem  and  Moore 
of  the  21st  Infantry,  and  Lieutenants  Boutelle  and  Kyle 
of  the  1st  Cavalry.  Colonel  Perry  and  Lieutenant  Kyle 

4M 


26  MODOC     WAR. 


are  painfully  wounded.  Surgeon  McElderry,  of  Fort 
Klamath,  and  Acting  Assistant  Surgeons  Skinner,  White 
and  Durrant,  were  under  fire  during  the  entire  day,  ren 
dering  prompt  service  to  the  wounded  of  both  regular 
and  volunteer  forces.  The  management  of  the  volunteers 
by  General  Ross  and  his  subordinates,  Captains  Kelly, 
Applegate  and  J.  R.  Neil,  the  latter  of  General  Ross' 
Staff,  was  admirable.  Captain  E.  1).  Fond  ray,  also  of 
General  Ross'  Staff,  accompanied  his  Commander  upon 
the  field.  Hon.  J.  JST.  T.  Miller  was  present,  and  rendered 
important  service  during  the  engagement.  At  General 
Ross'  request  he  has  been  actively  engaged  in  the  field 
from  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  The  volunteers 
conducted  themselves  in  the  most  creditable  manner,  and 
in  a  manner  honorable  to  the  State.  Surgeon  Bell,  of  the 
volunteers,  was  promptly  at  his  post  in  the  field. 

The  Independent  Company  of  California  Volunteers, 
Captain  John  A.  Fairchilds,  occupied  a  most  important 
position  on  the  extreme  left,  and  were  greatly  exposed 
during  the  entire  day.  They  formed  a  portion  of  the 
party  under  Major  Green  and  Colonel  Perry,  that  forced 
its  way  over  great  natural  obstacles,  and  through  a  most 
terrible  fire,  to  a  junction  with  Captain  Bernard's  forces 
on  the  east.  Four  (4)  of  this  Company  wer.^  seriously 
wounded. 

The  courtesy  of  the  officers  of  the  United  States  Army 
commanding  here,  toward  the  volunteers,  has  been  marked 
and  uniform,  and  their  material  assistance  to  our  troops 
has  been  valuable. 

General  Wheaton  moved  his  headquarters  and  tempo 
rary  field  depot  to  this  point,  where  a  concentration  of  the 
forces  was  made  for  the  attack.  On  the  28d  inst.  his 
headquarters  and  field  depot  will  be  re-established  in  Lost 


MODOC    WAR.  27 


River  Valley,  near  Tule  Lake,  in  Oregon,  a  much  more 
central  and  controlling  point.  The  volunteer  headquarters 
will,  about  the  same  time,  be  established  at  some  point  in 
that  vicinity. 

I  have  assigned  Colonel  William  Thompson,  of  the 
Governor's  Staff  (by  order  transferred^  service  with  me), 
and  Colonel  C.  B.  Bellinger,  to  duty  in  the  field.  They 
accompanied  me,  and  participated  in  the  engagement  of 
the  17th  inst. 

Mr.  Ivan  Applegate  was  present  upon  the  field  during 
the  engagement,  and  rendered  important  service. 
Very  respectfully  and 

Obediently  yours, 

JOHF  F.  MILLER, 

Major  General  O.  S.  M» 


MODOC     WAR.  29 


REPORT 

OF 

GENERAL   JOHN  E.  ROSS 

TO 

HIS  EXCELLENCY  GOVERNOR  GROVER. 


HEADQUARTERS  IST  BRIGADE  1 

OREGON  MOUNTED  MILITIA,          > 

Jacksonville,  February  20,  1873.     j 

His  Excellency 

L.  F.  Grover,  Governor  of  Oregon, 

Salem,  Oregon: 
SIR: — I    have    the    honor    to     submit    the    following: 

O 

report  of  the  operations  of  the  troops  under  my 
command  in  their  recent  campaign  against  the  Modoc 
Indians. 

Before  doing  so,  however,  permit  -me  to  submit  a  few 
remarks  in  reference  to  the  origin  of  the  Modoc  war. 

An  order  had  been  made  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  that  the  Modoc  Indians,  then  encamped  on  Lost 
River,  should  return  immediately  to  their  (the  Klamath) 
Reservation.  The  Indians  refused  to  obey.  Maj.  James 
Jackson,  U.  S.  A.,  with  35  men,  was  directed  to  carry  the 
order  into  execution.  This  force  being  entirely  too  small  to 
command  obedience,  the  Indians  at  once  commenced  hos 
tilities,  by  butchering  the  settlers  on  Lost  River,  who 


30  MODOC    WAR. 


were  entirely  ignorant  of  any  impending  conflict  between 
the  tribe  and  the  Government.  It  should  be  remembered 
also,  that  these  murders  were  not  committed  whilst  actual 
war  was  raging  between  the  Indians  and  the  United 
States,  but  that  they  were  perpetrated  before  that  state  of 
affairs  had  an  existence.  The  U.  S.  troops  were  on  the 
west  side  of  Lost  River,  as  was  also  the  camp  of  Captain 
Jack,  the  head  chief  of  the  Modocs.  The  settlers  that 
were  massacred,  lived  and  were  murdered  on  the  east  side 
of  that  river.  The  Messenger  of  the  Superintendent  of 
Indian  Affairs  went  to  the  Indians  camped  on  the  east  side 
of  the  river  and  notified  them  that  the}7  were  required  to 
go  immediately  upon  the  Reservation.  Whilst  the  proper 
officers  were  urging  the  Indians  to  go  upon  the  Reserva 
tion,  they  (the  Indians)  commenced  firing,  and  the  first 
person  killed  was  John  Thurber,  a  private  citizen.  This 
was  on  Friday,  November  29th,  1872.  A  number  of 
the  other  settlers  soon  met  a  similar  fate,  and  the  survi 
vors  fled  for  refuge  to  the  house  of  Dennis  Crawley,  pur 
sued  by  the  Indians.  Meanwhile  two  other  citizens,  W. 
NUS  and  Joseph  Pen  wig,  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on, 
were  riding  up  toward  Crawley 's  house  ;  the  Indians  rode 
out  and  met  them,  saluted  them  in  a  friendly  manner  but 
suddenly  fired  upon  them,  killing  Nus  instantly  and 
severely  wounding  Penwig,  who  succeeded,  however,  in 
making  his  escape.  In  all,  eighteen  inoffensive  settlers 
were  thus  inhumanly  butchered.  Meanwhile,  the  Indi 
ans  having  fired  upon  the  troops,  the  fire  was  returned, 
but  Maj.  Jackson's  command  being  entirely  inadequate  to 
cope  with  the  savages,  was  forced  to  retire.  Such  was 
the  origin  of  the  Modoc  war;  a  war  commenced  on  the 
part  of  the  Indians  by  an  unprovoked  and  cold  blooded 
massacre  of  inoffensive  settlers,  butchered  whilst  pursuing 


MODOC    WAR.  31 


their  usual  avocations,  and  who  met  their  terrible  fate,  not 
during  the  existence  of  a  state  of  recognized  warfare,  but 
immediately  anterior  to  its  commencement,  i.  c.  in  time 
of  peace. 

In  obedience  to  your  Excellency's  instructions,,!  en 
listed  two  companies  of  Mounted  Militia,  whose  term  of 
service  commenced  on  the  2d  of  December  last.  By  the 
7th  of  that  month  most  of  my  command  was  mounted 
and  equipped,  and  sent  forward  to  the  settlers  in  the 
Ivlamath  Lake  Basin,  and  on  that  date,  after  detailing 
Maj.  W.  A.  Owen  of  my  staff,  to  act  as  Quartermaster 
and  Commissary  for  the  Brigade,  with  instructions  to 
make  his  headquarters  at  Jacksonville,  and  to  purchase 
and  forward  with  dispatch  all  necessary  supplies  for  the 
troops,  I  started  for  the  front  accompanied  by  my  two 
Aids-de-Camp,  Capts.  E.  1).  Foudray  and  J.  R.  Niel,  and 
also  Col.  J.  ]N\  T.  Miller,  Commissary  General.  Maj.  J. 
K.  Bell,  the  Brigade  Surgeon,  had  started  the  day  previ 
ous.  We  arrived  at  Linkville  on  the  9th. 

The  two  companies  referred  to  consisted  of  Co.  A, 
Capt.  H.  Kelly,  and  Co.  B.,  Capt.  O.  0.  Applegate.  Capt. 
Kelly  had  temporarily  established  his  headquarters  at  the 
north  end  of  Tule  Lake,  some  ten  miles  from  the  mouth 
of  Lost  River,  and  was  engaged  in  searching  for  the 

O      O  O 

bodies  of  the  settlers  that  had  recently  been  murdered  by 
the  Indians.  Capt.  Applegate  was  directed  to  station  a 
part  of  his  company  at  Yainax,  on  the  Klamath  Indian 
Reservation,  until  further  orders,  to  protect  the  United 
States  property  there;  to  scout  over  the  surrounding  val 
ley;  to  guard  the  settlers  from  being  raided  upon  by 
Indians,  and  to  cut  off  all  communication  between  the 
hostile  Modocs  and  friendly  Modocs  on  the  Reservation. 
The  remainder  of  Co.  B,  under  1st  Lieut.  J.  II.  Hyzer, 
accompanied  my  headquarters. 


32  MODOC     WAR. 


On  the  10th  December  I  arrived  at  Capt.  Kelly's  camp 
and  the  following  day  his  men  succeeded  in  finding  the 
last  of  the  missing  bodies  of  the  murdered  settlers,  which 
I  forwarded  to  Linkville  for  burial.  There  being  now  no 
further  need  of  a  military  force  in  the  vicinity  of  Lost 
River,  the  settlers  having  all  fled  the  country  or  been 
murdered  by  the  Indians,  I  determined  to  move  my  troops 
to  a  position  on  the  west  side  of  Tule  Lake,  as  near  as 
practicable  to  Captain  Jack's  stronghold  in  the  Lava 
Beds,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  we  started  for  the 
point  referred  to.  On  our  way  we  passed  the  camp  of 
Maj.  John  Green,  U.  S.  A.,  to  whom  I  communicated 
your  Excellency's  instructions  to  co-operate  with  the  U. 
S.  forces  in  the  field.  Maj.  Green  was  much  pleased  to 
receive  this  information,  cordially  approved  any  proposed 
change  of  position,  and  promised  to  send  Capt.  David 
Perry  with  Co.  F,  1st  Cavalry,  to  join  me  in  a  couple  of 
days.  We  arrived  at  Van  Bremer's  ranch  on  Willow 
Creek,  California,  the  same  evening  after  a  hard  day's 
march  of  40  miles.  We  found  the  ranch  deserted  and  a 
notice  on  the  door  to  the  effect  that  the  proprietor  had 
fled  through  fear  of  Indians. 

Next  day  Capt.  John  A.  Fairchild's,  the  owner  of  a 
ranch  in  the  vicinity,  and  who  afterwards,  as  Captain  of  a 
Company  of  California  Volunteers,  co-operated  with  us 
against  the  Modocs,  came  to  my  headquarters,  stated 
that  himself  and  neighbors,  being  entirely  unprotected, 
were  in  constant  danger  of  being  killed  by  the  Indians, 
and  expressed  himself  as  highly  pleased  that  we  had 
come  to  their  relief.  I  informed  him  that  we  were 
Oregon  Militia,  and  being  then  in  the  State  of  California, 
we  were  beyond  our  proper  limits  and  would  have  to  re 
turn  to  our  own  State,  unless  the  officer  in  command  of 
the  U.  S.  forces  ordered  otherwise. 


MODOC    WAR.  33 


The  abovo  facts  I  also  communicated  to  Maj.  Green, 
then  in  command  of  the  U.  S.  troops,  operating  in  that 
section,  who  immediately  issued  Field  Order  No.  2,  order 
ing  me  to  station  my  troops  at  such  points  as  I  might 
"deem  best  for  the  protection  of  the  people  in  the  State 
of  California  against  the  raids  of  the  Modoc  Indians." 
[See  the  order  hereto  attached.] 

In  the  evening  of  December  13th  I  was  joined  by  Capt. 
D.  Perry,  U.  S.  A.,  and  his  command.  On  the  15th,  Capt. 
Kelly,  Co.  A.,  with  twenty-five  men,  First  Lieut.  J.  H. 
Hyzer,  Co.  B,  with  ten  men,  Capt.  J.  R.  Neil,  of  my  staff, 
and  Capt.  Perry,  U.  S.  A.,  with  thirty  men,  made  the  first 
reconnoissance  of  the  Indian  strongholds  in  the  Lava  Beds. 

It  being  now  deemed  best  by  Capt.  Perry  and  myself, 
for  the  protection  of  the  settlements  northwest  of  Little 
Klamath  Lake,  that  my  troops  should  take  a  position  in 
that  locality,  I  moved  my  command  on  the  19th  of  De 
cember,  and  established  my  headquarters  at  Small's  ranch, 
on  the  Klamath  River.  The  condition  of  the  road  across 
the  mountains  being  such  as  to  make  it  impossible  for 
teams  to  transport  supplies  as  fast  as  needed,  I  next  day, 
in  company  with  Capt.  Foudray,  of  my  staff,  made  a  visit 
to  Linkville  to  secure  some  additional  stores  for  my  troops. 

Whilst  at  Linkville  it  was  ray  good  fortune  to  meet  and 
form  the  acquaintance  of  Major  General  Frank  Wheaton, 
U.  S.  A.,  Commander  of  the  District  of  the  Lakes,  who 
had  just  arrived  and  was  gratified  to  learn  that  your  Ex 
cellency  had  instructed  me  to  act  in  concert  with  the  U.  S. 
forces  operating  against  the  Modoc  Indians.  He  also 
assured  me  that  the  presence  of  our  Volunteer  Militia  in 
the  field  was  actually  necessary,  and  on  learning  that  we 
were  needing  some  more  blankets  he  gave  an  order  on  the 
quartermaster  at  Fort  Klamath  for  an  adequate  supply, 

5M 


34  MODOC  WAR. 


stating   at  the  same   time  that   anything  he    could   do  to 
make  my  troops  comfortable  would  be  cheerfully   done. 

Returning  from  Linkville  I  reached  Small's  ranch  in 
the  evening  of  the  21st  of  December,  and  immediately 
issued  to  my  troops  the  supplies  I  had  procured. 

Next  morning,  in  company  with  Col.  Miller  and  dipt. 
Neil,  I  left  headquarters  with  the  view  of  selecting  a  camp 
near  the  Indian  stronghold.  While  at  the  house  of  P.  A. 
Dorris  a  courier  reached  me,  direct  from  Captain  Perry, 
informing  me  that  the  command  of  Col.  R.  F.  Bernard,  U. 
S.  A.,  had  been  attacked  by  the  Indians  in  full  force,  on 
the  south  side  of  Tule  Lake;  that  he  (Capt.  Perry)  had 
gone  to  Bernard's  relief,  and  requesting  me  to  push  for 
ward  my  troops  without  delay  to  his  assistance.  A  courier 
was  dispatched  at  once,  with  orders  to  Capt.  Kelly  and  Lieut. 
Ilyzer  to  come  up  immediately,  which  orders  were  promptly 
executed,  and  upon  the  arrival  of  the  troops  they  were  sent 
forward  to  Captain  Perry's  relief.  About  ten  miles  beyond 
Van  Bremer's,  however,  our  troops  met  Captain  Perry 
and  his  command  returning,  the  Indians  who  attacked 
Bernard  having  been  driven  back.  In  consequence  of 
this  attack  Captain  Perry  deemed  it  best  that  my  head 
quarters  shjuld  be  re-established  at  Van  Bremer's,  to 
which  I  assented,  and  this  move  was  effected  in  the  night 
of  the  22d  of  .December. 

On  the  5th  of  January  Captain  Kelly,  Co.  A.,  with  ten 
of  his  men,  accompanied  by  Donald  McKay,  and  four 
friendly  Indians,  under  orders  from  me  to  view  out  a 
shorter  route  between  Van  Bremer's  and  the  Lava  Bed, 
came  upon  and  attacked  a  party  of  18  or  20  Modocs.  The 
Indians  fled  to  the  outer  edge  of  the  Lava  Beds,  not  far 
from  the  Modoc  camp,  and  gave  battle  from  behind  rocks. 
Captain  Kelly  fought  them  until  Captain  Jack  and  his 
band  corning  up  and  being  about  to  surround  our  men, 


MODOC  WATl.  35 


Captain  Kelly  fell  back  and  offered  battle  on  the  open 
ground.  This  offer,  however,  although  Jack's  force 
greatly  outnumbered  ours,  was  declined,  and  the  enemy 
retiring  to  their  stronghold,  Captain  Kelly  and  his  men 
returned  to  camp. 

On  the  9th  of  January,  in  obedience  to  the  order  of 
Gen.  Wheaton  (See  his  Special  Field  Order,  No.  8,  hereto 
attached),  I  stationed  Co.  A,  Captain  Kelly,  on  Cotton- 
wood  Creek,  about  eight  miles  from  Van  Bremer's,  at 
the  intersection  of  the  Modoc  trail  with  the  main  road,  lor 
the  purpose  of  escorting  supplies;  to  guard  the  Whittle's 
Ferry  road  against  interruption  by  hostile  Indians,  as 
also  to  afford  more  adequate  protection  to  the  citizens 
located  southwest  of  Little  Klamath  Lake. 

On  the  12th  of  January  Capt.  Applegate  and  his  com 
pany,  accompanied  by  Col.  Miller,  of  the  Oregon  Militia, 
with  Captain  Perry,  U.  S.  A.,  and  13  men,  the  whole  un 
der  the  command  of  Major  Green,  U.  S.  A.,  had  a  lively 
brush  with  the  enemy,  at  the  top  of  the  bluff' overlooking  the 
Lava  Bed,  in  which  the  Modocs  were  forced  to  retire  beyond 
the  range  of  our  guns.  It  is  not  known  certainly  what  dam 
age  was  inflicted  on  the  Indians  in  this  engagement,  as  their 
warriors  were  carried  off  as  fast  as  hurt,  but  it  is  believed 
they  suffered  the  loss  of  four  or  five  men,  whilst  our 
troops  were  uninjured. 

On  the  same  day  Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  Miller,  of  the 
Oregon  Militia,  with  his  staff  officers,  Col.  C.  B.  Bellinger 
and  Cal.  Wm.  Thompson,  arrived  at  my  headquarters. 

The  16th  January  was  the  day  fixed  by  Maj.  Gen. 
Wheaton,  (see  his  General  Field  Orders,  Kos.  1  and  3, 
herewith  attached)  for  an  advance  movement  of  the  Reg 
ular  and  Volunteer  forces,  under  his  command,  with  a 
view  of  making  a  combined  attack  the  next  day,  the 
17th,  on  Captain  Jack's  stronghold.  The  line  of  battle 


36  MODOC  WAR. 


was  to  be  formed  as  follows:  Capt.  Fairchilds,  with  his 
company  of  California  Volunteer  Rifles,  was  to  hold  the 
extreme  left,  resting  his  left  flank  on  Tule  Lake;  Col. 
Mason's  forces  to  be  on  Fairchild's  right;  Capt.  Kelly's 
company  on  Mason's  right;  Capt.  Applegate's  company 
on  Kelly's  right  and  Capt.  Perry's  command  on  Apple- 
gate's  right,  with  Lieut.  Ross,  U.  S.  A.  and  twenty  men, 
in  the  rear  to  guard  the  Howitzer  Battery.  Col.  Bernard, 
with  his  forces  and  those  of  Maj.  Jackson  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Lake,  was  to  form  into  line  of  battle  with  his 
right  resting  on  Tule  Lake,  arid  advancing  simultaneously 
to  form  a  connection  with  Capt.  Perry's  right,  so  as  to 
enclose  the  southern  side  of  the  Modoc  position.  The 
immediate  command  of  the  entire  force  operating  against 
the  Modocs  was  given  to  Maj.  John  Green,  U.  8.  A.,  to 
whom  was  entrusted  the  execution  of  the  general  plan  of 
operations,  as  also  the  details  of  the  attack.  Our  united 
forces  were  as  follows:  U.  S.  forces,  about  810;  Oregon 
Militia,  115;  California  Volunteers.  25.  Total,  450. 

On  the  morning  of  the  16th  January  I  moved  my  com 
mand  in  the  direction  of  the  bluff  overlooking  the  Lava 
Bed,  for  a  position  some  three  miles  west  of  Captain 
Jack's  camp,  reaching  the  desired  point  in  the  afternoon 
where  we  encamped  for  the  night.  Capt.  Perry,  having 
started  earlier,  had  taken  possession  of  the  bluff  and 
driven  oft'  the  Indian  scouts  or  pickets.  Col.  Bernard  had 
also  moved  out  from  the  east  side  of  the  Lake,  but  get 
ting  into  an  engagement  with  the  enemy  was  compelled 
to  fall  back. 

On  the  17th  January,  at  4  o'clock  in  the  morning,  my 
entire  command  marched  down  the  bluff  and  took  posi 
tion  in  line  of  battle  as  designated  in  the  Field  Orders 
referred  to. 


MODOC  WAR.  37 

When  all  was  ready  and  the  command  given  the  line 
moved  forward,  onr  advance  being  directly  into  the  so- 
called  "Lava  Beds."  The  ground  traversed  was  covered 
at  intervals  with  irregular  masses  of  volcanic  rock,  whilst 
a  dense  fog  prevailed  over  the  entire  region.  These  im 
pediments,  it  is  true,  made  our  advance  somewhat  labori 
ous  and  difficult,  but  in  no  wise  dampened  the  ardor  of 
the  troops.  After  proceeding  a  mile  and  a  half  the 
enemy  opened  fire  upon  us,  the  first  volley  being  fired  in 
front  of  Capt.  Kelly's  company.  Soon  the  firing  of  the 
enemy  extended  along  our  entire  front  and  was  promptly 
and  vigorously  returned.  But  the  Indians  being  secreted 
behind  rocks  and  crags,  in  caves  and  deep  fissures,  our 
bullets,  though  well  aimed,  had  little  or  no  effect.  When 
charged  upon  in  one  rock  fortress  the  enemy  would  retire 
to  another  position  equally  formidable.  The  difficulties 
of  our  advance,  owing  to  these  natural  obstructions,  and 
the  fact  that  we  were  constantly  exposed  to  the  raking 
fire  of  a  concealed  enemy,  were  now  greatly  increased. 
Moreover,  the  Indians  were  perfectly  familiar  with  every 
crag,  crevice  and  chasm  in  this  immense  lava  field,  whilst 
our  knowledge,  in  respect  to  these  particulars,  amounted 
practically  to  nothing.  About  11  o'clock  A.  M.  Capt. 
Perry,  in  obedience  to  the  order  of  Maj.  Green,  changed 
the  position  of  his  company  from  Capt.  Applegate's 
right  to  the  right  of  Maj.  Mason  and  connecting  with 
Capt.  Kelly's  left.  The  dense  fog  of  the  morning  had  not 
yet  lifted;  still  our  line  moved  steadily  on,  driving  the 
Indians  before  us,  but  there  seemed  to  be  no  end  to  the 
rocky  strongholds  to  which  they  could  fall  back.  Our 
successful  charges  and  the  noble  enthusiasm  of  the  troops, 
were  therefore  of  little  avail.  Meanwhile,  we  were  suffer 
ing  severely  in  killed  and  wounded,  without  being  able  to 


88  MoDOO  WAR. 


inflict  any  very  serious  injury  upon  the  enemy.  About  3 
p.  M.  our  troops  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake  were  ordered 
to  form  a  connection  with  those  of  Co].  Bernard,  on  the 
east  side,  by  a  flank  movement  to  the  left. 

The  necessity  for  this  order  was  owing  to  the  fact  that 
the  disaster  met  with  by  Col.  Bernard  on  the  day  previous, 
rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  form  a  connection  with 
our  extreme  right,  as  stated  in  the  general  orders  referred 
to.  Meanwhile,  the  unequal  contest  in  which  all  the 
advantages  were  against  us,  was  kept  up  with  undimin- 
ished  vigor. 

About  5  o'clock  P.  M.,  whilst  engaged  in  the  flank 
movement  referred  to,  it  was  discovered  that  Major  Green, 
who  had  the  immediate  command  of  the  troops,  as  before 
stated,  together  with  Col.  Mason  and  Captain  Perry,  with 
their  respective  commands,  had  been  cut  off  by  the 
Indians  from  the  main  line  and  from  all  communication 
with  General  Wheaton's  headquarters. 

At  this  juncture,  Gen.  Wheaton,  in  view  of  the  situation, 
and  the  absence  of  Major  Green,  deemed  it  proper  to 
give  me  the  immediate  command  of  the  remaining  forces 
in  the  field,  using  also  these  words:  "Gen.  Eoss,  I  now 
leave  this  matter  with  you/' 

I  hastened  at  once  to  act  in  the  capacity  indicated.  We 
had  been  enveloped  in  fog  all  day,  and  the  Indian  war 
whoop  and  roar  of  guns  had  been  kept  up  without  inter 
mission.  Our  troops  had  fought  for  nine  hours  with  heroic 
bravery,  and  had  suffered  a  loss  of  forty  men,  killed  and 
wounded,  but  without  gaining  any  important  advantage 
over  the  enemy;  night  was  Upon  us;  the  weather  was 
extremely  cold  and  our  overcoats  and  blankets  had  been 
left  behind  at  camp.  Moreover,  if  the  Indians  with  their 
superior  knowledge  of  the  ground,  should  make  a  night 


MODOC  WAR.  39 


attack  on  us  we  might  suffer  considerable  additional  loss. 
Under  these  circumstances  I  determined,  with  the  assent 
of  my  superior  officers,  to  move  the  troops  back  to  our 
camp  of  the  preceding  night,  leaving  the  enemy  in  posses 
sion  of  the  field  and  our  dead.  With  as  little  delay  as 
possible  therefore,  we  gathered  up  our  wounded  and  got 
our  troops  in  motion;  Company  B,  Capt.  Applegate,  being 
in  front  and  Co.  A,  Capt,  Kelly,  acting  as  rear  guard,  and 
reached  our  camp  back  on  the  bluff  about  10  o'clock  that 
night. 

jSText  morning  we  ascertained  that  Major  Green,  as  also 
Col.  Mason,  Capt.  Perry,  Col.  Bernard  and  Maj.  Jackson, 
with  their  respective  commands,  had  withdrawn  during 
the  night  previous  to  Col.  Bernard's  camp  on  the  east 
side  of  the  lake. 

Gen.  Wheaton  now  decided,  after  consultation  with 
Gen.  Miller,  myself  and  other  officers,  that  a  further 
attack  upon  the  Indians  in  the  Lava  Bed  was  not  advisa 
ble. 

The  casualties  of  the  previous  day  may  be  briefly 
summed  up  as  follows,  viz:  U.  S.  troops,  37  killed  and 
wounded ;  Oregon  Militia,  2  killed  and  5  slightly  wounded; 
California  Volunteers,  4  wounded,  of  whom  2  afterwards 
died.  The  two  members  of  the  Oregon  Militia,  who  lost 
their  lives  in  this  engagement,  were  privates  John  R. 
Brown,  Co.  A,  and  William  F.  Trimble,  Co.  B,  both  brave 
men,  who  fell  while  gallantly  discharging  their  duty. 

The  actual  strength  of  the  enemy  in  this  engagement 
is  not  known,  but  is  estimated  at  from  150  to  200,  all  well 
armed,  together  with  quite  a  number  of  squaws,  who  are 
known  to  have  rendered  service  as  warriors. 

On  the  morning  after  the  battle,  and  before  moving 
from  our  camp  on  the  bluffs,  in  compliance  with  the  view 


40  MODOC  WAR. 


of  General  Wheaton,  as  also  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
better  protection  to  the  settlements,  I  issued  orders  making 
the  following  disposition  of  the  troops  under  my  command, 
viz:  Capt.  Applegate  with  a  portion  of  Co.  B  to  be  sta 
tioned  at  Yainax;  Lieut.  Hyzer,  with  a  portion  of  Co.  B, 
to  be  stationed  at  Schneider's  Ferry;  the  remainder  of  Co. 
B  to  be  stationed  at  Langell's  Valley;  Lieut.  Reams,  with 
a  portion  of  Co.  A,  to  be  stationed  at  the  ranch  of  Capt. 
Fairchilds,  and  the  remainder  of  Co.  A,  together  with 
myself  and  staff,  to  remain  at  the  headquarters  of  Gen. 
Wheaton,  until  the  return  of  the  commands  that  had  been 
cut  off  from  us  on  the  day  previous.  Pursuant  to  these 
arrangements,  the  troops  started  at  once  for  their  several 
destinations,  and  in  company  with  General  Wheaton  I 
arrived  at  Van  Bremer's  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  of 
January. 

Maj.  Green,  as  also  the  commands  of  Col.  Mason  and 
Capt.  Perry,  having  all  reached  Gen.  Wheaton's  head 
quarters  by  the  22d  January,  on  the  morning  of  the  23d 
I  marched  with  Co.  A  to  Schneider's  Ferry.  !N"ext  day, 
January  24th,  the  term  of  enlistment  of  my  men  having 
expired,  and  U.  S.  troops  having  arrived  to  take  the  place 
of  my  own,  in  the  protection  of  the  settlement,  I  issued 
my  General  Field  Order  No.  3,  for  the  disbandment  of  the 
1st  Brigade  Oregon  Mounted  Militia. 

For  a  more  specific  and  detailed  account  of  the  move 
ments  and  services  performed  by  Companies  A  and  B  of 
my  command,  you  are  respectfully  referred  to  the  reports 
of  Captains  Kelly  and  Applegate,  hereunto  attached. 

In  conclusion,  permit  me  to  say,  in  reference  to  the 
troops  under  my  command,  that  the  field  of  their  opera 
tions  was  in  a  region  of  country  whose  altitude  was  some 
4,500  feet  above  the  level  of  the  ocean,  distant  from  the 


MODOC    WAft*  41 


Rogue  Kiver  Valley,  my  base  of  supplies,  some  80  miles,, 
and  separated  fiom  that  vailey  by  a  high  range  of  moun 
tains;  that  the  period  of  our  service  was  during  mid* 
winter,  at  which  season  the  road  over  the  mountains 
referred  to  was  at  all  times  exceedingly  difficult  for  loaded 
teams  to  travel,  and  much  of  the  time  utterly  impassable; 
that  in  the  hurry  with  which  the  troops  were  sent  into  the 
field,  some  necessary  articles  were  unavoidably  omitted^ 
and  that  the  supplies  forwarded  by  LJaj.  Owen  from  Jack 
sonville  did  not  always,  owing  to  the  impassable  condition 
of  the  road,  reach  us  as  soon  as  heeded;  that  my  com 
mand  performed  a  vast  amount  of  hard  inarching,  and 
endured  at  times  much  suffering  from  the  severity  of  the 
weather,  necessarily  incident  to  the  high  altitude  of  the 
country  and  the  inclement  season  of  the  year.  But  my 
troops  always  responded  with  promptness  to  every  demand 
made  upon  their  patriotism,  enduring  every  hardship 
patiently,  and  evincing  under  the  most  adverse  circum 
stances,  a  devotion  to  duty  that  would  have  done  credit  to 
veteran  soldiers. 

I  desire  to  state  that  the  gallantry  and  bravery  displayed 
in  the  engagement  of  the  17th  by  Gen.  Wheaton,  Majk 
Green,  Col.  Masor,  and  Captains  Perry,  Adams  and 
Burton,  is  worthy  of  highest  commendation;  and  that 
their  gentlemanly  courtesy  to  myself  and  staff,  as  also  the 
generous  provision  made  by  the  Commanding  Officer,  for 
the  comfort  of  my  troops,  will  ever  be  gratefully  remem 
bered. 

I  will  also  add  that  the  company  of  California  Riflemen^ 
commanded  by  Capt»  John  A.  Fairchilds,  bore  themselves 
nobly,  displaying  a  dauntless  courage  and  bravery  >  alike 
creditable  to  themselves  and  the  State  in  whosj  service 

they  were  enlisted. 
GM 


42  MODOC     WAK. 

I  desire  to  state  also  that  Maj.  Gen.  Miller  and  bis  two 
staff  officers,  Col's.  Bellinger  and  Thompson,  as  also  Col. 
Miller,  Corn.  Gen'].,  occupied  positions  in  the  line  of 
battle,  and  by  their  brave  conduct,  proved  themselves 
worthy  of  the  commissions  they  hold  under  the  broad  seal 
of  the  State  of  Oregon. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir, 

Very  respectfully. 

Your  obd't  serv't, 

JOHN  E.  ROSS. 
Brig.  Gen'l!*st  Brig  Ogn.  MiK 


HEADQUARTERS,  IST  BRIGADE,  } 

OiiEii'oN  STATE  MILITIA, 
Jacksonville,  Oregon,  July  4,  1878.  j 

To  His  Excellency   L.  P..  Grocer,    Governor  of  Oregon, 

•Salt mt.  Oregon  : 

SIR  : — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report 
of  the  operations  of  the  First  Brigade  of  Oregon  Mounted 
Militia,  being  their  second  service,  in  the  late  Modoc  war. 

As  this  force  was  called  into  service  by  your  Excellency, 
at  the  request  of  the  people,  for  the  purpose  of  suppress 
ing  Indian  hostilities,  and  protecting  the  settlements  in 
the  eastern  portion  of  Jackson  county,  it  may  not  be  im 
proper  to  give  a  brief  statement  of  the  facts  which  made 
the  presence  of  these  troops  necessary  in  the  field. 

After  the  battle  ot  the  Lava  Beds,  on  the  17th  of  Jan 
uary  last,  a  Peace  Commission  was  appointed  by  the  Pres 
ident  to  negotiate  terms  of  peace  -with  the  Modoc  Indians. 
Hopes  were  entertained  that  this  Commission  would  be 


MODoc   WAR.  43 


able  to  so  adjust  all  matters  of  difficulty  with  those  Indi 
ans,  as  to  secure  a  permanent  peace  with  the  tribe.  Du 
ring  the  progress  of  the  negotiations,  however,  it  became 
apparent  that  no  faith  whatever  was  to  be  placed  in  any 
peaceful  professions  of  the  Indians,  and  members  of  the 
Board,  becoming  satisfied,  from  time  to  time,  of  this  state 
of  affairs,  would  resign.  But  their  places  were  promptly 
filled  by  the  appointment  of  new  Commissioners,  it  being 
strongly  desired  by  the  General  Government  that  the 
Modoc  difliculties  should  be  settled  by  treaty  without  fur 
ther  bloodshed. 

lu  this  way  negotiations  were  kept  up  lor  about  three 
months,  when  the  proceedings  of  the  Board  were  brought 
to  an  abrupt  termination  by  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the 
Indians  to  massacre  the  entire  Commission.  This  attempt 
was  partially  successful,  Gen.  Can  by  and  Rev.  Mr.  Thomas 
being  killed  on  the  spot,  Mr.  Meacham.  another  of  the 
Commissioners  being  badly  wounded  and  left  for  dead,  and 
L.  S.  Dyar,  the  remaining  Commissioner,  only  saving  his 
life  by  flight.  This  terrible  act  of  perfidy  and  savage 
cruelty  of  course  put  an  end  to  peaceful  negotiations,  and 
tjie  Indians,  recuperated  by  this  three  months'  rest,  rein 
forced  by  renegades  from  other  tribes,  and  strengthened 
by  additional  supplies  of  arms,  ammunition,  clothing  and 
subsistence,  which  they  had  all  this  time  been  collecting, 
again  started  on  the  war  path,  with  increased  vigor  and 
ferocity. 

At  this  time,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  that  all  the 
U.  S.  troops  heretofore  stationed  in  Southeastern  Oregon 
had  been  removed  south  of  our  State  boundary  line,  leav 
ing  the  settlements  of  the  Lake  Basin  Without  any  mili- 
ttl'y  force  whatever  to  protect  them.  In  fact  there  was 
not  at  this  time  a  single  company  of  U.  S.  troops  within 

9  '        •'  - 
I  ft 


44  MODOO     WAR. 


the  limits  of  the  State  of  Oregon.  Let  us  now  pa  me  for 
a  moment  to  coisider  tlie  condition  of  the  settlements  of 
Southeastern  Oregon.  The  ^assacre  of  the  Peace  Com 
missioners  was,  of  course,  the  signal  for  the  renewal  of 
Indian  hostilities.  If  the  Modocs  should  fall  back  upon 
the  Lava  Beds,  the  settlements  referred  to  would  beat  the 
mercy  of  the  Indians.  Or,  if  the  Indians  on  the  Klarnath 
Keservation,  who  had  thus  far  remained  friendly,  should 
determine  to  join  the  hostile* — of  which  there  was  great 
danger — their  first  movement  would  be  to  murder  the  set 
tlers,  burn  their  houses  and  drive  off  their  stock.  It  will 
thus  be  seen  that  the  southeastern  portion  of  the  State 
was  in  constant  and  imminent  peril,  for  upon  the  happen 
ing  of  either  or  both  the  contingencies  referred  to,  the 
settlements  in  that  section  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  In 
dian  cruelty  and  rapacity. 

Under  these  circumstances  an  adequate  military  force  in 
the  Lake  Basin,  to  prevent  by  their  presence  an  outbreak 
on  the  part  of  the  Indians  on  the  Reservation,  and  also  to 
protect  the  settlements  from  hostile  Modocs,  became  an 
indispensable  necessity.  But  there  being  no  U.  S.  troops 
for  this  purpose,  the  only  alternative  left  was  to  raise  the 
required  force  by  a  volunteer  enrollment  of  the  Oregon 
Militia.  Still  your  Excellency,  anxious  to  avoid  expense, 
and  hoping  that  the  U.  S.  troops  would  soon  terminate  the 
war,  declined  at  first  to  authorize  the  enrollment  of  any 
State  troops. 

The  massacre  of  the  Peace  Commissioners  occurred 
April  11, 1873.  Gen.  Gillem,  then  in  command  of  the  U. 
S.  forces  in" the  field,  immediately  commenced  an  attack 
upon  the  Indians  in  the  Lava  Beds.  The  fighting  lasted 
three  days,  at  the  expiration  of  whjjeh  time,  the  Indians 
havin  been  cut  of  from  water,  although  not  defeated. 

* 


MODOC     WAR.  45 


withdrew  from  their  first  position  in  the  Lava  Beds  and 
retired  to  another.  It  was  understood  by  this  movement, 
t'.iat  the  Indian;  had  abandoned  -the  Lava  Beds  entirely 
and  fallen  hack  into  the.  Lost  river  country,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  raiding  upon  settlements,  cutting  off  communica 
tion  with  the  Lake  Basin  and  forcing  the  Indians  on  the 
Ivlamath  Reservation  to  join  them.  By  order  of  Gen. 
Giliem,  couriers  were  dispatched  to  warn  the  settlers  of 
their  danger,  and  stop  communication  with  that  country, 
except  by  way  of  Yreka,  California.  The  U.  S.  troops  in 
their  three  days  fight  .had  accomplished  nothing  towards 
improving  the  situation  of  affairs.  In  fact  the  settlements 
of  southeastern  Oregon  were  more  than  ever  at  the  mercy 
of  infuriated  savages.  Moreover  the  Chief  Winnemucca, 
with  his  band  of  Piutes,  and  t'lo  Chief  Ocheho,  with  his 
band  of  Snakes,  had  been  making  war  demonstrations, 
a  id  it  was  now  apparent  that  a  general  Indian  outbreak 
could  only  be  prevented,  if  at  all,  by  throwing  a  force  of 
Volunteers  into  the  field  noith  of  the  California  line. 
Under  these  circumstances,  your  Excellency  was  again 
earnestly  besought  by  our  citizens  to  authorize  enlist 
ment  of  Militia,  and  this  time  their  petition  was  granted. 

In  compliance  with  your  instructions  of  the  14th  of 
April,  I  proceeded  at  once  to  e:iroll  three  comptin'es  of 
Mounted  Militia,  to  be  mustered  into  the  1st  Brigade. 
e  troops,  when  raised,  consisted  of  Company  C,  Capt, 
.  Ilyzer;  Company  D,  Ca.pt.  Thomas  Mulholland,  and 
Company  E,  Capt.  George  It.  Rrgei'S.  The  men  were 
equipped  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  sent  forward  in  de 
tachments  into  the  Lake  Basin,  my  object  being  to  keep 
the  road  open  between  that  section  and  the  Rogue  River 
Valley,  to  r.rotect  the  settlements  from  -i  aids  of  the 


r. 

ujt 


Modocs,  anujto  prevent  by   our   presence  in  the  field,  the 


* 
* 


48  MODOC    WAR. 


Indians  who  had  thus  far  remained  friendly  from  joining 
the  hostiles.  In  order  to  secure  a  speedy  termination  of 
the  war,  as  much  depended  upon  my  ability  to  prevent 
any  further  outbreak  of  Indians,  as  upon  the  success  ot 
the  U.  S.  troops,  now  operating  against  the  Modocs  in  the 
Lava  Beds  south  of  the  Oregon  line. 

About  this  time  I  received  a  letter  from  L.  S.  Dyar. 
Esq.,  U.  S.  Indian  Ager.l  in  charge  of  the  Klamath  Indian 
Reservation,  from  which  I  make  the  following  extract:  "I 
respectfully  request  that  you  send  a  strong  detachment  to 
Yainax — a  station  on  the  Klarnath  Reservation.  Such  u 
course  would,  I  think,  not  only  protect  the  settlers  upon 
the  Upper  Sprague  River,  but  would  do  more  to  prevent 
a  general  Indian  outbreak  than  anything  else  that  you 
could  do,  as  it  would  almost  insure  quiet  among  the  Snakes 
and  Modocs  now  there,  and  prevent  a  raid  upon  that  [dace 
by  Capt.  Jack's  warriors."  Being  satisfied  that  the  views 
of  Agent  Dyar,  as  above  expressed,  were  correct,  an 
adequate  force  of  Militia  was  stationed  at  the  point  above 
referred  to,  in  compliance  with  his  request. 

The  settlers  in  Drews  Valley,  as  also  in  the   valleys  of 

M 

Goose  Lake,    Chewaucan  and  Summer   Lake,    being   in  ' 
great  danger  of  being   raided   upon  by  the  Indians,  Capt. 
Mulholland  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  his  company   to 
those  valleys  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  station  his  force  so 
as  to  afford  the  greatest  protection  in  his  power  to  th|£<t 

settlements. 

. 
Companies  C  and  E  were  stationed  at  different    points 

in  the  settlements,  west  of  those  above  named,  and  \\v.e 
employed  in  scouting  the  country,  so  as  to  make  their 
presence  and  their  object  known  to  both  the  friendly  and 
hostile  Indians.  Meanwhile  the  United  Statestroops  wene 
operating  vigorously  agai.ist  Capt.  J.aV,^  an  l(/is  *  and  of 

* 


r.  -4 


i 


MODOC     WAR.  47 


murderers  in  the  Lava  Beds,  and  I  now  felt  certain  that 
the  objects  for  which  my  troops  had  been  raised  would  be 
a-'jcomplished,  and  that  the  war  would  soon  be  brought  to 
a  speedy  and  successful  termination. 

The  disaster  met  with  by  the  Indian*  in  their  attack 
near  Sorass  Lake,  on  the  10th  of  May,  proved  to  be  the 
turning  point  in  the  campaign,  and  the  position  of  Capt, 
Jack,  alter  that,  became  hopeless.  With  the  United 
Slates  forces  operating  in  his  front,  with  disaffection  in  his 
own  camp,  and  with  the  Oregon  Militia  cutting  off  all 
hope  of  assistance  from  the  Indians  on  the  Reservation,  he 
had  no  other  alternative  than  to  surrender. 

Learning  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  May  that  Capt. 
•lack,  with  a  portion  of  his  warriors,  had  made  their  escape 
from  the  Lava  Beds  and  gone  in  the  direction  of  Langcll 
Valley,  I  started  immediately  with  Capt.  Hyzer's  Com 
pany,  accompanied  by  my  staff,  and  arrived  at  the  eastern 
end  of  the  valley  referred  to  on  the  evening  of  the  81st. 
Soon  after  going  into  camp,  a  scouting  party  was  sent  out 
with  orders  to  examine  the  ground  tor  signs  of  the  fugi 
tive  Modocs,  and  aiter  a  short  absence  the  party  returned 
reporting  the  discovery  of  fresh  Indian  tracks  on  a  moun 
tain  south  of  our  camp.  Thereupon  I  immediately  dis 
patched  1st  Lieut.  Lindsay,  of  Company  0,  with  twenty 
picked  men  to  occupy  the  summit  of  the  mountain  re 
ferred  to  with  orders  to  keep  a  sharp  watch  for  Indians,  to 
capture  id  I  he  discovered,  and  to  shoot  down  all  that  re 
fused  to  surrender.  Meanwhile  having  learned  that  Ma 
jor  John  Green,  U.  S.  A.,  with  his  command,  was  camped 
some  four  miles  east  of'rne,  I  dispatched  a  courier  to  him 
next  morning  to  inform  him  of  my  whereabouts,  and  of 
the  discovery  made  on  the  evening  previous.  In  a  short 
time  Major  Green  came  to  my  camp,  and  expressed  a  de- 


48  MOI)OG     WAR. 


sire  that  my  troops  act  in  concert  with  those  of  the  United 
Statej  in  capturing  the  fugitive  Modocs.  A  party  of  tliose 
Indians  were  believed  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  a  small  lake 
in  the  mountains  ten  miles  east  of  our  camp.  A  plan  of 
co-operation  for  the  capture  of  those  Indians  was  agreed 
upon  between  Major  Green  and  myself,  in  pursuance  of 
which  both  commands  moved  by  different  routes  at  mid 
night,  on  the  first  of  June,  for  the  point  referred  to.  My 
troops  being-  the  first  to  arrive  at  the  place  designated,  and 
discovering  fresh  Indian  tracks,  started  immediately  in 
pursuit  and  followed  the  trail  until  night  coming  on  they 
were  compelled  to  camp.  As  soon  as  day  dawned  next 
morning  the  pursuit  was  renewed  and  kept  up  all  day  over 

**  €/ 

an  extremely  rough  country.  At  dark  the  Indians  were 
overtaken  and  captured.  The  captives  numbered  twelve, 
among  whom  was  the  notorious  "Black  Jim,"  one  of  the 
murderers  of  Gen.  Canby. 

^ext  day,  June  4th,  I  sent  a  messenger  to  Major  Green, 
informing  him  of  the  captures  we  had  made,  and  also  for 
warded  a  dispatch  to  your  Excellency  upon  the  same  sub 
ject.  In  reply  I  received  a  note  from  M.ijor  Green,  re 
questing  me  to  send  my  captives  to  an  island  in  Tule  Lake, 
at  which  all  the  Indian  captives  were  being  collected. 
[See  copy  of  his  letter  hereunto  attached.]  I  also  re 
ceived  a  telegram  fiom  your  Excellency  containing  in 
structions  in  regard  to  the  same  subject.  In  obedience  to 
these  orders  I  took  immediate  steps  to  ascertain  if  a:iy  of 
these  Indians  stood  indicted  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Jack- 
sou  county  for  the  murder  of  the  Lost  river  settlers,  and; 
having  become  satisfied  that  none  of  them  were  concerned 
in  that  massacre,  I  proceeded  with  my  captives  to  the 
island  referred  to  and  delivered  them  up  to  the  command 
ing  officer  of  the  U.  S.  troops  at  that  place. 


MODOC  WAR.  49 


The  Modoc  war  being  now  brought  to  a  successful  ter 
mination  by  the  capture  of  Capt.  Jack  and  the  principal 
portion  of  his  warriors,  and  there  Being  no  further  neces 
sity  for  my  troops  in  the  field,  I  issued  a  general  order 
that  they  proceed  at  once  to  the  respective  places  at  which 
they  were  enrolled  and  be  mustered  out  of  the  service. 

In  conclusion  I  desire  to  state  that  much  credit  is  due 
to  our  Militia  for  the  prompt  and  energetic  manner  in 
which  they  discharged  their  duty ;  and  that  they 
successfully  accomplished  all  the  objects  for  which  they 
were  enrolled. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JUHN  E.  BOSS, 
Brig.  Gen.  1st  Brig.,  0.  M. 


MODOC    WAR.  51 


REPORTS  TO  GEN'L  ROSS. 


HEADQUARTERS  IN  THE  FIELD,  ] 

Crawley's  Ranch,  December  14, 1872.  / 

Field  Order  No.  2. 

Brigadier  General  John  E.  Ross,  1st  Brigade  Oregon 
Militia,  with  his  volunteer  force,  will  station  his  troops  at 
such  points  as  he  may  deem  best  for  the  protection  of  the 
people  in  the  State  of  California  against  the  raids  of  the 
Modoc  Indians. 

JOHN*  GREEN; 

Major  1st  U  S.  Cavalry,  Commanding. 


WILLOW  CREEK,  2  o'clock,  A.  M. 

GENERAL  Ross  —  Enclosed  you  will  find  communica 
tion  from  Major  Green,  which  explains  itself.  I  shall  leave 
immediately  by  trail  for  the  "  Lava  Beds,"  and  would  like 
your  support  in  case  I  should  be  driven  back.  My  wagons, 
with  a  small  guard,  are  on  the  road,  and,  if  possible,  I 
would  like  to  have  you  secure  them  as  well  as  the  rancher 
at  this  place. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

D.  PERRY, 

Captain  1st  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


52  MODOC    WAR. 


HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  THE  LAKES, 

And  of  the  Troops  operating  in  the 

Modoc  country. 
Camp  near  Crawley's  Ranch, 

Lost  River,  Oregon,  Dec.  20, 1872.  J 

General  Field  Order  No.  1. 

I.  The  disposition  of  the  troops,  and  all  field  orders 
and  instructions  heretofore  given  by  Major  John  Green, 
1st  Cavalry,  are  fully  approved. 

II.  Major   John    Green,   1st   Cavalry,  will   retain  the 
immediate  command  of  the  troops  now  acting  under  his 
orders,  and   attack  the   Modoc  Indians  wherever,  in  his 
opinion,  sufficient  supplies  and  ammunition  are  received,  as  it 
is  reported,  by  parties  who  are  familiar  with  Modoc  Jack's 
location,  that  it  is  inaccessible  to  mounted  troops,  and  that 
three  miles  of  skirmishing  on  foot  will  be  required  before 
reaching  the  Modoc  position. 

Major  Green  will  not  make  the  attack  until  the  troops 
are  well  provided  with  ammunition.  Each  man  should  be 
furnished  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  (150)  rounds,  sixty 
(60)  on  his  person,  and  the  remainder  in  close  reserve,  if 
that  amount  can  be  procured. 

III.  .From  information  thus  far  obtained  it  is  deemed 
best  to  make  the  strongest  attack  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Modoc   position   and    Tule   Lake.      The   battalion,    21st 
Infantry,  Companies  "C"  and  "B,"  sixt}T-four  (64)  rifled 
muskets,  under  Major  E.   C.  Mason;   Captain  D.  Perry, 
Troop  "F,"  1st  Cavalry,  fifty  (50)   sabres;  Major  James 
Jakson,  Troop  "B,"  1st  Cavalry,  thirty-five   (35)  sabres; 
and  General  John  E.  Ross,  Oregon  Volunteers,  supposed 
to  number  about  fifty  (50)  rifles,  will  make  the  main  attack. 
Captain  R.  F.  Bernard,  Troop   "G,"   1st  Cavalry,  with  a 
detachment  of  Klamath  scouts,  the  number  to  be  desig- 


MODOC     WAR.  53 


nated  by  Major  Green,  will  co-operate  with  the  main 
attack,  moving  simultaneously  on  the  Modoc  position,  and 
on  the  east  side  from  his  present  camp  near  Land's  ranch. 

IV.  Major  Green  will  cause  frequent  reconnoisances 
from  the  several  commands,  to  be  made  while  prepartions 
for  the  final  attack  are  being  made,  and  report  anything  of 
interest  to  the  District  Commander,  who  will  remain  in 
the  field  with  or  near  the  troops  until  further  operations 
against  the  Morlocs  are  unnecessary. 

It  may  become  necessary  to  change  or  modify  this  gen 
eral  plan  of  operations,  and  Major  Green  will  be  advised 
from  time  to  time'  of  any  proposed  change. 

Y.  If,  during  or  after  the  attack  on  the  Modocs,  they 
should  escape  from  their  rocks  and  caves,  Major  Green  will 
promptly  pursue  with  all  the  mounted  force,  and  kill  or 
capture  every  hostile  Modoc  of  Captain  Jack's  murdering 
band,  unless  they  unconditionally  surrender. 

VI.  If  rapid  pursuit  becomes  necessary,  Major  E.  C. 
Mason's  battalion,  21st  Infantry,  Mall  be  left  near  the  Modoc 
camp,  where  he  will  receive  orders  from  the  District  Com 
mander. 

VII.  A  temporary  field  depot  of  supplies  is  hereby 
established  at  this  camp.     Lieutenant  "W".  H.  Boyle,  21st 
Infantry  (acting  Adjutant,  and  A.  A.  Q.  M.  and  A.  C.  S. 
of  the  21st  Infantry  battalion),  will,  in  addition  to  his 
other    duties,   receive    and    issue    supplies   on    properly 
approved  requisitions.     Lieutenant  Boyle  will  communi 
cate  at  once  with  Lieutenant  Robert  Pollock,  21st  Infantry 
A.  A.  Q.  M.,  at  Fort  Klamath,  Oregon,  the  officer  respon 
sible  for  supplies  sent  here,  and  keep  him  fully  advised  of 
the  issues  and  reception  of  stores  for  troops  in  the  field. 

When  Major  Mason's  battalion  moves,  Lieutenant  W. 
H.  Boyle  will,  until  further  orders  from  Headquarters, 


54-  MODOC  WAR. 


District  of  the  Lakes,  remain  in  charge  of  the  camp  and 
supplies  near  Crawley's  ranch. 

VIII.  All  reports,  returns,  etc.,  will  be  made  to  or 
through  these  Headquarters,  and  requisitions  for  supplies 
forwarded  for  the  action  of  the  Commanding  Officer,  Dis 
trict  of  the  Lakes. 

By  order  of 

FRA^K  WHEATOF, 

Brevet  Major  General  U.  S.  A.,  Lieut.  Col.  21st 

Infantry,  Commanding  District  of  the  Lakes. 

OFFICIAL  — 

J1TO.  Q.  ADAMS, 
First  Lieut.  1st  Cavalry,  A.  A.  A.  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  THE  LAKES,  " 
And  of  Troops  operating  in  the  Modoc 
country. 
Camp  near  Van  Bremer's, 

Willow  Creek,  California, 

January  9,  1873.  > 

Special  Field  Order  No.  8. 

With  a  view  to  the  more  adequate  protection  of  the 
citizens  located  southwest  of  Little  3£lamath  Lake,  and  to 
guard  against  the  interruption  of  hostile  Modocs  on  the 
Whittle's  Ferry  Road,  General  Ross,  Oregon  Militia, 
will  detail,  from  the  two  companies  now  with  him  in  the 
field,  such  a  force  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  encamp 
them  at  the  most  advantageous  point. 

A  force  encamped  near  Dorris'  Ranch  would  be  able  to 


MODOC  WAR.  55 


escort  supplies,  and,  at  the  same  time,  be  advisable  if  a 
sudden  movement  from  this  camp  should  be  ordered. 

By  order  of 

FRANK  WHEATON, 

Brevet  Major  General,  U.  S.  A.,  Lieut.  Col.  21st 

Infantry,  Commanding  District  of  the  Lakes. 
OFFICIAL  — 

JNO.  Q.  ADAMS, 
First  Lieut.,  1st  Cavalry,  A.  A.  A.  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  THE  LAKES, 

And  of  the  Troops  operating  in  the 

Modoc  country. 
Camp  near  Van  Bremer's, 

California,  January  12,  1873,  J 

General  Field  Order  No.  3. 

I.  The  troops  will  move  from  their  present  camps  east 
and  west  of  the  Lava  Beds,  on  Thursday  the  16th  of  Jan 
uary,  and  take  positions  for  the  attack  on  the  Modoc  camp 
at  sunrise  on  the  following  morning. 

II.  At  four  A.  M.,  on  Thursday  next,  Major  John  Green 
will  detach  Captain  D.  Perry's  Troop  "F,"   1st  Cavalry, 
and  order  it  to  clear  the  bluff  southwest  of  Tule  Lake  of 
Indian  pickets  and  scouts,  and  cover  the  movement  of  the 
main  force  to  a  camp  some  three  miles  west  of  the  Modoc 
position. 

III.  Major  E.  C.  Mason's  battalion,  21st  Infantry,  (two 
companies),  "  C,"  Captain  G.  H.  Burton;  and  "B,"  com 
manded  by  2d  Lieutenant  II.  D.  W.  Moore,  and  a  detach 
ment  of  twenty  (20)  men  of  Company  "F,"  21st  Infantry, 
under  1st  Sergeant  John  McNamara;  General  John  E. 
Ross,  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia  ( two  companies ):  "A," 


56  MODOC     WAR. 


Captain  H.  Kelly,  and  "B,"  Captain  O.  C.  Applegate,  and 
Lieutenant  W.  H.  Miller's  Battery  (a  section  of  mountain 
howitzers),  will  march  from  Van  Bremer's  Ranch  to  camp 
on  bluff,  west  of  Tule  Lake,  in  time  to  reach  the  desig 
nated  camp  not  later  than  three  p.  M.  on  the  16th  instant. 
The  camp  will  be  so  located  and  arranged  as  to  be  secure 
from  observation  by  the  Modocs,  and  every  precaution 
taken  to  prevent  the  Indians  from  discovering  our  num 
bers  and  precise  location. 

IV.  District  headquarters  will  accompany  the  troops. 

V.  Early  on  the    17th  of  January  the   troops  above 
named  will  move  into  the  Lava  Beds  to  attack  the  Modoc 
camrj,  and  in  the  following  order:  Major  E.  C.  Mason's 
battalion,  21st  Infantry  leading,  followed  by  General  John 
E.  Ross,  Oregon  Volunteer  Militia,  (the  section  of  how 
itzers  packed).     Captain  D.  Perry,  troop  "F,"  1st  Cav 
alry,  will  follow  the  Howitzer  Battery. 

VI.  When  the  troops  have  reached  a  position  near  the 
Modoc  camp  the  main  force  will  be  deployed  on  the  right 
of  the  infantry  battalion  in  close  skirmish  order,  and  a  left 
half-wheel  of  the  whole  line  will  be  executed,  in  order  to 
enclose  the  southern  side  of  the  Modoc  position  and  con 
nect  the  right  of  the  main  force  with  the  left  of  Captain 
Bernard's  troops,  who  are  simultaneously  to  attack  on  the 
east. 

VII.  All  the  troops  operating  against  the  Modocs  are 
to  move  from  their  camps  with  three  day's  cooked  rations 
in  haversacks,  two  blankets,  one  hundred  (100)  rounds  of 
ammunition  on  the  person,  and  fifty  (50)  rounds  in  close 
reserve.     Canteens  will  be  filled  at  Little  Klamath  Lake 
by  the  troops  from  Van  Bremer's  Ranch,  and  care  taken 
to  water  every  horse  and  pack  mule  at  that  point,  as  there 
is  no  water  on  the  bluff  where  the  main  force  will  encamp 
on  the  night  of  the  16th. 


MODOC    WAR.  57 


VIII.  Major  John  Green,  1st  Cavalry,  is  charged  with 
the  execution  of  these  movements  and  the  details  of  the 
attack. 

IX.  Lieut.  W.  II.  Miller,  1st  Cavalry,  commanding  the 
Howitzer  Battery,  will  report  to  Major  Green  for  orders 
and  instructions  as  to  when  and  where  to  prepare  his  guns 
for  action  in  the  proposed  attack. 

X.  The  troops  on  the  east  side  of  the  Lava  Beds,  at 
Land's  Ranch,  Cos.  «G,"  Capt,  R.  F.  Bernard,  and  «B," 
Captain  James  Jackson,  1st  Cavalry,  and  the  Klamath  In 
dian  scouts,  under  Dave  Hill,  will  move  from  camp  on  the 
IGth  inst.,  to  a  point  not  more  than  two  (2)  miles  from  the 
Modoc  position.     At  sunrise  on  the  17th  this  force  will 
attack  the  Modoc  camp  with  their  right  resting  on  or  near 
Tule  Lake,  and  when  sufficiently  near  to  render  the  move 
ment  advisable,  a  right  half-wheel   will  be  executed  in 
order  to  connect  the  left  of  this  force  with  the  troops  at 
tacking  from  the  west.     In  his  advance  Captain  Bernard 
will  take  steps  to  capture  any  canoes  the  Modocs  may 
have  near  their  camp,  or  at  least  use  every  effort  to  pre 
vent  Indians  from  escaping    by  water.      Captain   R.  F. 
Bernard,  1st  Cavalry,  will  execute  these  movements  under 
such  detailed  instructions  as  he  may  receive  from  Major 
John  Green,  1st  Cavalry. 

XI.  After  the  first  three  (3)  shots  have  been  fired  from 
the  Howitzer  Battery,  as  a  signal  to  the  troops  attacking 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Modoc  camp,  firing  will  cease  for 
fifteen  (15)  minutes,  and  an  Indian  scout  directed  to  notify 
the   nearest  Modocs  that  ten   (10)   minutes  time  will  be 
allowed  them  to  permit  their  women  and  children  to  come 
into  our  lines.     Any  proposition  by  the  Modocs  to  surren 
der  will  be  referred  at  once  to  the  District  Commander 

who  will  be  present. 
SM 


58  MODOC    WAR. 


XII.  Lieut.  W.  II.  Boyle,  21st  Infantry,  Acting  Field 
Quartermaster  and  0.  S.,  and  a  guard  of  ten  men  will  re 
main  at  this  camp  in  charge  of  the  temporary  Held  depot 
until  further  orders. 

XIII.  Lieut.  John  Q.  Adams,  1st  Cavalry,  A.  A.  A.  G., 
District  of  the  JLakes,  and  commanding  detachment  "H," 
troop   1st    Cavalry,  will  furnish  from  his  command  such 
details  as  may  be  required  for  the  Howitzer  Battery,  and 
accompany  the  District  Commander.     Lieut.  Adams  will 
be  prepared  to  communicate  by  signals  with  the  Signal 
Sergeant  who  has  been  detailed  for  duty  with  the  troops 
operating  on  the  east  side  of  the  Modoc  position. 

XIV.  Assistant  Surgeon  Henry  McEldery,  U.  S.  A., 
will  give  the  necessary  directions  and  instructions  to  the 
medical  officers  serving  with  the  different  commands  and 
detachments  in  the  field. 

By  order  of 

FRANK  WHEATON, 

Brevet  Maj.  Gen.  U.  S.  Army,  Lieut.  Col.  21st  Infantry, 
Commanding  District  of  the  Lakes. 

OFFICIAL — 

JOHF  Q,  ADAMS, 
1st  Lieut.  1st  Cavalry,  A.  A.  A.  Gen. 


HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY  COMMAND,  1 

Clear  Lake,  Cal.,  June  4,  1878.      f 

Brig.  Gen.  John  E.  Boss,  0.  V.  M.,  in  the  Feild  — 
GENERAL:  I  am  in  receipt  of  your  note  of  this  instant 
at  10  o'clock  A.  M.  The  Department  Commander  is  col 
lecting  all  the  Modoc  captives  at  the  island  in  Tule  Lake, 
and  it  is  requested  that  you  send  your  captives  to  that 
point  as  early  as  possible,  or  if  more  convenient  they  can 


MODOC    WAR.  59 


be  sent  to  me  at  this  place,  if  the}7  are  forwarded  within 
the  next  two  days.  When  the  services  of  the  two  Modocs, 
Jim  and  Frank,  are  no  longer  required  by  you,  let  them 
come  here. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

Your  Ob't  servant, 

JOHN  GREEN, 
Major  1st  Cavalry,  Commanding. 


WALLOWA   VALLEY.  61 


OFFICIAL  COMMUNICATION 

From  the  Governor  of  Oregon  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  Relative  to  the  Indian  Title  and  Rights  of 
Settlers  in  Wallowa  Valley,  Oregon. 


STATE  OF  OREGON,  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  \ 
Salem,  July  21,  1873.      / 
To  Hon.  Columbus  Delano, 

Secretary  of  the  Interior: 

SIR: — I  beg  leave  to  call  your  attention  to  the  very 
grave  and  important  question  now  pending  before  your 
Department,  touching  the  subject  of  vacating  the  Wallowa 
Valley,  Union  county,  Oregon,  for  the  purpose  of  secur 
ing  the  same  to  Joseph's  band  of  Nez  Perce  Indians, 
and  to  submit  the  following  views  thereon  for  your  con 
sideration. 

On  and  prior  to  the  llth  day  of  June,  1855,  the  Nez 
Perce  tribe  of  Indians  occupied  lands  lying  partly  in 
Oregon  and  partly  in  Washington  Territory,  between  the 
Cascade  and  Bitter  Root  Mountains.  On  said  llth  day 
of  June,  1855,  the  said  tribe,  by  their  chief,  head  men 
and  delegates,  numbering  fifty-eight  officials,  made  and 
concluded  a  treaty  of  peace  and  boundaries  with  the 
United  States — Isaac  I.  Stephens  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States  for  Washington  Territory,  and  Joel  Palmer 
for  Oregon.  By  said  treaty  the  Nez  Perces  ceded  and 
relinquished  to  the  United  States  all  their  right,  title  and 


62  WALLOWA    VALLEY. 


interest  in  and  to  all  territory  before  that  time  claimed 
and  occupied  by  them,  except  a  certain  tract  described 
therein,  specifically  reserved  from  the  ceded  lands  as  a 
general  reservation  for  the  use  and  occupancy  of  said 
tribe,  and  for  friendly  tribes  and  bands  of  Indians  in 
Washington  Territory.  This  general  reservation  embraced 
lands  lying  in  part  in  Oregon,  including  Wallowa  (Woll- 
low-how)  Valley. 

On  the  9th  day  of  June,  1864,  a  supplementary  and 
amendatory  treaty  was  concluded  between  the  said  Nez 
Perce  tribe  and  the  United  States;  the  former  being  rep 
resented  by  fifty-one  chiefs,  head  men  and  delegates,  and 
the  latter  by  Calvin  H.  Hale,  Charles  Hutchins  and  S.  D. 
Howe,  as  Commissioners  specially  delegated. 

By  the  latter  treaty  the  Kez  Perce  tribe  agreed  to 
relinquish,  and  did  relinquish  to  the  United  States  all  the 
lands  reserved  by  the  treaty  of  1855,  excepting  a  certain 
specified  tract  designated  as  "a  home,  and  for  the  sole  use 
and  occupancy  of  said  tribe."  B}7  this  amendatory  treaty 
the  Nez  Perce  tribe  relinquished  to  the  United  States  all 
the  territory  embraced  in  the  Reservation  created  by  the 
treaty  of  1855,  which  lay  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
State  of  Oregon,  including  the  said  Wallowa  Valley ;  so 
that  on  and  after  said  9th  June,  1863,  the  ]N~ez  Perce 
tribe  did  not  lawfully  hold  or  occupy  any  lands  within 
the  State  of  Oregon.  Joseph's  band  of  Nez  Perce 
Indians  were  in  the  treaty  council  of  1855,  and  Joseph 
signed  the  treaty.  Their  action  recognized  the  tribal 
relations  of  their  band,  and  bound  all  the  persons  and 
territory  described  therein.  The  Reservation  named  be 
came  the  common  property  of  the  whole  tribe.  Joseph 
and  his  band  acKnowledged  these  conclusions  also  by 
accepting  the  benefits  of  the  treaty  of  1855.  But  Joseph 


WALLOW  A   VALLEY.  63 


refused  to  acknowledge  the  treaty  of  1863,  while  a  Jarge 
majority  of  the  chiefs  and  head  men  of  the  Nez  Perce 
tribe  signed  the  same.  Joseph  died  in  1871,  and  his  sons 
claim  the  land  which  was  relinquished  to  the  United 
States  in  1863,  including  Wallowa  Valley.  This  claim 
is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  band  which  they  repre 
sent  was  not  bound  by  the  treaty  of  1863. 

The  United  States  had  established  the  policy  of  treat 
ing  with  the  Indians  as  tribes  and  nations.  This  policy 
was  predicted  on  the  necessary  fact  that  organized  action 
by  the  tribe  or  nation  binds  the  whole  body  and  all  of  its 
members.  The  treaty  of  1855  is  the  organized  action  of 
the  l^ez  Perce  tribe,  in  relation  to  land  in  which  the 
whole  tribe  had  a  common  interest.  If  the  Government 
shall  admit  that  one  sub-chief,  out  of  more  than  fifty 
joined  in  council,  can,  by  refusing  his  signature,  or  by  ab 
senting  himself,  defeat  the  operation  of  a  treaty,  the 
policy  of  making  treaties  would  be  valueless  and  but  few 
treaties  would  be  binding.  For  there  exists  hardly  a 
treaty  with  Indians  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  in 
which  all  the  sub-chiefs  and  head  men  joined,  and  against 
which  they  have  not  positively  protested.  If  we  draw 
our  conclusions  from  the  former  practice  of  the  Govern 
ment,  or  from  assimilated  cases  of  foreign  treaties,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  treaty  of  1863  bound  all  the 
Nez  Perces  and  extinguished  the  Indian  title  to  all  lands 
previously  occupied  by  that  tribe  lying  within  the  State 
of  Oregon. 

Acting  upon  this  conclusion,  by  order  of  the  General 
Land  Office,  bearing  date  May  28,  1867,  the  public  lands 
in  Wallowa  Valley  and  vicinity  were  directed  to  be  sur 
veyed  and  opened  for  settlement.  The  surveys  made 
under  this  order  amounted  to  eleven  townships,  which 


64  WALLOWA   VALLEY. 


were  approved  May  9,  1868.  From  time  to  time,  since 
that  period,  citizens  of  this  State  have  become  settlers 
upon  these  lands  to  such  an  extent,  as  I  am  now  informed, 
that  eighty-seven  farms  have  been  located  and  pre-emp 
tion  and  homestead  claims  have  been  filed  thereto  in  the 
U.  S.  Land  Office  at  La  Grande. 

Upon  this  statement  of  facts  I  urge  that  the  Indian  title 
to  the  lands  occupied  by  these  settlers  has  been  doubly 
extinguished.  First  by  treaty,  and  second,  by  force  of 
law.  As  the  Indians  have  only  a  right  of  occupancy,  and 
the  United  States  have  the  legal  title,  subject  to  occu 
pancy,  and  with  an  absolute  and  exclusive  right  to  extin 
guish  the  Indian  title  of  occupancy,  either  by  purchase, 
conquest,  or  by  legal  enactment,  it  would  follow  that  if 
the  treaty  of  1863  did.  not  completely  extinguish  the 
Indian  title  to  the  lands  in  question,  the  acts  of  the  Gov 
ernment  in  surveying  the  Wallowa  Valley  and  opening 
the  same  for  settlement  and  the  consequent  occupancy  of 
the  same  by  settlers  under  the  provisions  of  the  several 
acts  of  Congress  affecting  such  lands,  and  the  recognition 
of  these  claims  by  the  Local  Land  Office  of  the  United 
States,  would  work  a  complete  extinguishment  of  the 
Indian  title  *by  operation  of  law,  as  far  as  the  occupied 
lands  are  concerned. 

There  are  other  Chiefs  and  head  men  of  the  Kez  Perces, 
who  did  not  sign  the  treaty  of  1863,  and  who  have  re 
fused  and  still  do  refuse  to  acknowledge  its  binding  force. 
If  the  Government  shall  in  this  instance  accede  to  the 
demands  of  Joseph's  band  and  create  a  new  Keservation 
for  them,  or  shall  admit  in  their  favor  the  nullity  of  the 
treaty  of  1863,  as  far  as  they  are  concerned,  a  score  of 
like  demands  from  other  discontented  bands,  connected  with 
other  neighboring  tribes,  living  under  treaties  negotiated 


WALLOW  A    VALLEY.  65 


in  a  similar  way,  will  be  immediately  pressed  upon  tho 
attention  of  the  Indian  Bureau.  I  nrn  thoroughly  per 
suaded  that  if  the  proposed  surrender  of  the  Walloxva 
Valley,  and  the  adjacent  regions,  to  these  TnTTiaiv,  he  now 
consunirnated  as  demanded,  the  measure,  if  it  works  as  a 
special  pacification  in  this  instance,  will  cause  a  general 
dissatisfaction,  not  only  with  the  Nez  Perees,  hut  with  all 
neighboring  tribes  living  under  treaty  relations,  and  this 
character  of  work  will  have  to  be  entered  upon  a, id  cur 
ried  out  as  to  all. 

The  declaration  made  by  Congress  March  3d,  1871, 
that  "hereafter  no  Indian  nation  or  tribe  within  tho 
territory  of  the  United  States  shall  be  acknowledged  or 
recognized  as  an  independent  nation,  tribe,  or  power, 
with  whom  the  United  States  may  contract  by  treaty," 
appears  to  me  to  relieve  the  Department  irom  entangling 
itself  with  an  effort  to  reform  past  treaties,  as  such,  and  to 
leave  tho  Indian  Olh'ce  unembarrassed  to  adopt  such  policy 
as  will  subserve  the  best  interests  of  both  whites  and 
Indians,  without  submitting  its  judgment  to  the  caprices 
of  untutored  savages. 

In  addition  to  what  I  have  urged  against  re-establishing 
any  part  of  the  Nez  Perce  Indians  in  Oregon,  on  grounds 
growing  out  of  this  particular  case,  I  would  respectfully 
press  upon  your  consideration  the  general  policy  of  tho 
Government  heretofore  steadily  pursued,  of  removing  as 
expeditionary  as  circumstances  would  permit  of,  all  Indi 
ans  from  the  confines  of  the  new  States,  in  order  to  give 
them  the  opportunity  of  early  settlement  and  develop 
ment  and  to  make  way  for  civilization.  This  State  has 
already  much  of  its  best  soil  withheld  from  being  occu 
pied  by  an  industrial  population  in  favor  of  Indians. 

The  region  of  country  in  Eastern  Oregon  not  now  settled 

9M 


66  WALLOWA    VALLEY. 


and  to  which  the  Wai  Iowa  Valley  is  the  key,  is  greater 
in  area  than  the  State  of  Massachusetts.  If  this  section  of 
our  State,  which  is  now  occupied  by  enterprising  white 
families,  should  be  remanded  to  its  aboriginal  character, 
and  the  families  should  be  removed  to  make  roaming 
ground  for  nomadic  savages,  a  very  serious  check  will 
have  been  given  to  the  growth  of  our  frontier  settlements, 
and  to  the  spirit  of  our  frontier  people  in  their  efforts  to 
redeem  the  wilderness  and  make  it  fruitful  of  civilized 
life. 

There  is  abundant  room  for  Joseph's  band  on  the  pres 
ent  Nez  Perce  Reservation,  and  the  tribe  desire  to  have 
this  band  observe  the  treaty  of  1863.  I  learn  that  young 
Joseph  does  not  object  to  going  on  the  Reservation  at  this 
time,  but  that  certain  leading  spirits  of  his  band  do  object, 
for  the  reason  that  by  so  doing  they  would  have  to  aban 
don  some  of  their  nomadic  habits  and  haunts.  The  very 
objection  which  they  make  is  a  strong  reason  why  they 
should  be  required  to  do  so;  for  no  beneficial  influence  can 
be  exerted  by  agents  and  missionaries  among  the  Indians 
while  they  maintain  their  aboriginal  habits.  Joseph's 
band  do  not  desire  Wallowa  Valley  for  a,  Resercation  and 
for  a  home.  I  understand  that  they  will  not  accept  it  on 
condition  that  they  shall  occupy  it  as  such.  The  reason 
of  this  is  obvious;  they  can  have  better  land  and  a  more 
congenial  climate  at  a  location  which  has  been  tendered 
them  upon  the  Nez  Perce  Reservation.  This  small  band 
wish  the  possession  of  this  large  section  of  Oregon  simply 
for  room  to  gratify  a  wild,  roaming  disposition,  and  not  for 
a  home. 

There  are  but  seventy-two  warriors  of  this  band.  The 
white  settlers  in  the  Wallowa  country  number  eighty- 
seven.  There  are  also  in  the  Wallowa  Valley  two  incor- 


WALLOWA   VALLEY.  67 


porated  companies,  the  Wtillowa  Road  and  Bridge  Com 
pany  and  the  Prairie  Creek  Ditch  Company.  The  im 
provements  of  these  settlers  and  companies  have  been 
assessed,  as  I  am  informed,  by  a  commissioner  appointed 
under  the  direction  of  your  department,  to  the  amount  of 
$67,860. 

Considering  that  the  demands  of  Joseph's  band  were 
made  during  the  period  of  the  apparently  successful  re 
sistance  of  the  Modoc  outlaws  against  the  treaty  stipula 
tions  with  the  Klamaths,  and  that  now  the  Modocs  are 
subdued,  it  will  doubtless  be  much  less  expensive  to  the 
Government,  and  much  more  consistent  with  its  general 
Indian  policy,  to  induce  Joseph's  band  by  peaceable 
means  to  make  their  home  on  the  Nez  Perce  Reservation, 
than  to  purchase  the  rights  of  white  settlers  now  in  the 
"Wai Iowa  Valley.  The  people  of  this  State  have  uni 
formly  recognized  the  boundaries  of  legally  defined 
Indian  Reservations,  and  have  abstained  from  attempting 
to  establish  settlements  thereon.  In  all  instances  of  various 
difiictilties  between  settlers  and  Indians  on  our  frontier, 
since  the  Reservation  system  has  been  extended  to  Oregon, 
hostilities  have  resulted  rather  from  Indians  refusing  to 
confine  themselves  to  their  treaty  limits  than  from  any 
attempt  of  the  settlers  to  encroach  upon  Reservations. 
This  was  the  case  with  the  Yakimas  in  1855,  who  killed 
three  miners  outside  of  their  treaty  limits,  and  then  mur 
dered  Indian  Agent  Boland,  who  visited  them  to  remon 
strate  against  their  perfidy.  This  was  the  case  last  autumn 
with  the  Modocs,  and  is  now  the  case  with  Joseph's  band, 
in  the  light  in  which  the  treaty  of  1863  has  heretofore 
been  held  by  the  General  Government  and  by  the  people 
of  Oregon. 

I  believe  the  facts  will  sustain  me  in  saying  that  at  all 


68  WALLOWA    VALLEY. 


times  and  under  all  circn instances  our  frontier  settlers 
have  been  as  well  disposed  toward  tlie  Indian*,  and  as 
moderate  and  forbearing  as  those  of  any  other  frontier, 
and  as  much  so  as  the  people  of  any  other  State  would  be 
under  like  circumstances.  ' 

Urgently  pressing  upon  your  careful  consideration  the 
peculiar  features  of  this  subject,  and  on  behalf  of  the  inter 
ests  of  this  State  and  of  the  settlers  in  Wai  Iowa  Valley 
and  vicinity,  asking  that  the  preliminary  steps  taken  for 
the  vacation  of  said  Valley  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a 
Reservation  for  Indians  may  be  rescinded, 
I  have  the  honor  to  be 

Your  ob't  servant, 

L.  F.  G ROVER, 
Governor  of  Oregon. 

O 


